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Foreword
This was one of the objectives Joseph Rowntree set for himself, his fellow directors and succes-
sors in the founding document of the JosephRowntree ReformTrust Ltd in 1904.WhilstAppendix
B illustrates the nature of the concerns that Josephmay have had at the turn of the twentieth cen-
tury, StuartWilks-Heeghas amply demonstrated in this report thatwhilst the issues of concernmay
have changed, Directors were right to return to this subject in the twenty-first century.
Stuart covers the territory well. The impurities he considers include:
• The 2007 ‘election that never was’ – would it have been possible to have conducted it
properly?
• Are the electoral registers complete and accurate?
• Is the postal vote safe?
• Does electoral ‘modernisation’ increase turnout – or is it just unreliable and expensive?
• What is the influence of Biraderi on voting behaviour?
• Can seats be easily bought?
This is a serious list and it adds to the present discomfiture in British politics today. Frustratingly
the answers to many of the problems highlighted in this report are known and are to be found
in the electoral arrangements in Northern Ireland, a clear case of ‘what works’, as set out in the
conclusion to the report. We would also comment that the need for parties to focus their finan-
cial resources on a few voters in a fewmarginal seats could be solved by the introduction of pro-
portional representation…..but that is another story!
Themost recent convictions for electoral fraud,whereby a Slough councillor and his agentswere
found guilty of corrupt and illegal practices in relation to applications for registering to vote and
postal voting,were reported in themedia as this reportwas being prepared for publication, prov-
ing the need for urgent reform of electoral administrative processes and the timeliness of our
report. The election commissioner, RichardMawreyQC, has stated that postal voting ondemand
is “lethal to the democratic process”. He concluded in his judgment on the case: “There is no
reason to suppose this is an isolated incident. Roll stuffing is childishly simple to commit and
very difficult to detect. To ignore the probability that it is widespread, particularly in local elec-
tions, is a policy that even an ostrich would despise.”
“…and by all lawful means to promote or endeavour to secure
purity of election for Parliament, and for all municipal and other
public bodies in the United Kingdom, and by all lawful means to
influence public opinion in favour of all such legislative or
social reforms as shall to the Company appear desirable.”
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We hope that this report will assist the process of encouraging the government to lift its head
from the sand.We canonly agreewith Sir Christopher Kelly, Chair of theCommittee onStandards
in Public Life, who, in commenting on this case, has stated: “This latest example of electoral fraud
in Slough at last year’s local government elections highlights the need for fundamental changes
to our electoral system.… Electoral fraud is not a trivial matter. It is an affront to the democrat-
ic principle of one-person one vote. Left unchecked it will eventually undermine trust and con-
fidence in the democratic process and by implication the electorate’s consent to the outcome
of elections.”
David Shutt
Chair of the Joseph Rowntree Reform Trust Ltd.
March 2008
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Preface
During the past decade, views on electoral procedures in the UK have moved from a broad con-
sensus in favour of ‘modernising’ reforms to a highly polarised debate centred on competing
claims about the extent of electoralmalpractice and the degree towhich ballot secrecy and secu-
rity are being compromised. The extension of postal voting has come under particular scrutiny
for its potential vulnerability to electoral fraud, while pilots of electronic voting and counting
have also encountered numerous technical problems and raised concerns about the security of
the vote. Over the same time period, new regulations establishing transparent procedures for
the declaration of donations to political parties and introducing limits on expenditure during
election campaigns have evidently failed to settle disputes about the possible role of financial
resources in determining electoral outcomes. Indeed, it is no exaggeration to say that current
controversies about the integrity of elections in the UK are without precedent in recent British
political history.
There is no sense in which any of these controversies are abating. During the last quarter of
2007 alone: the Gould report on the Scottish elections ofMay 2007 was published, reaching the
conclusion that “the voter was treated as an afterthought”; court hearings into allegations of
electoral malpractice commenced in Birmingham, Peterborough and Bradford; inter-party talks
on the reform of party finance were convened and subsequently broke down; and a fresh row
broke out surrounding possible Labour Party transgressions of the law on donations to political
parties. InDecember 2007, the Electoral Commission called for “anopen andwide-rangingdebate
about the most appropriate effective structure for the delivery of elections across the UK”. The
case for such a reviewwas further underlined shortly after the turn of theNewYear.On22 January
2008, a Council of Europe report was published, expressing serious concerns about the lack of
safeguards against fraud within British electoral law.
In light of such concerns, this report was commissioned by the Joseph Rowntree Reform Trust
to review the extent towhich there is evidence of electoral principles andprocesses being under-
mined in the UK. The research on which the report is based principally comprised a review of
existing documentary sources in the public domain, drawn from a broad range of governmental,
legal, academic and journalistic sources. I was assisted in this task by two PhD students at the
University of Liverpool, Stephen Ackers and James Milton, and I have been grateful throughout
for their dedication and attention to detail. The documentary review was augmented with a set
of ten interviews with key national figures involved in electoral law and administration, includ-
ing senior representatives from the Electoral Commission, the Electoral Office for Northern
Ireland, theAssociationof ElectoralAdministrators, the Society of LocalAuthorityChief Executives
and the Association of Chief Police Officers. I wish to convey my thanks to all those who made
themselves available for interview, and also to Mark Ross, David Shutt and Tina Walker of the
Joseph Rowntree Reform Trust for their comments on two drafts of this report. It goes without
saying that all of the views expressed in this report are my own.
The research for this report has been underpinned by a rigorous commitment to construct an
evidence-based analysis of UK electoral processes. Every effort has been made to cross-refer-
ence sources and to verify the accuracy of all available data, in line with the highest standards
of independent scholarship. At the same time, it has been my intention throughout to present
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my findings in as accessible a manner as possible. To the non-specialist, debates about electoral
processes may well appear to be essentially bureaucratic and legalistic, and there is a sense in
which they must be both of those things. However, there is much more at stake here than the
technicalities of administrative or legal practice. When experienced international election
observers conclude that voters have been treated “as an afterthought”, or that elections “are
very vulnerable to electoral fraud”, it is clear that ensuring the integrity of our electoral process
should be a matter of great, and immediate, public concern.
On the day before this report was due to go to press, the judgment of Richard Mawrey QC, act-
ing as the Electoral Commissioner for the Slough Election Court, was issued. The judgment not
only emphasises that the reforms introduced by the Electoral Administration Act 2006 have
proved deficient in combating electoral fraud, but also that the rationale for postal voting as a
means of boosting turnout is likely to be fundamentally flawed. As the judge argued in the exec-
utive summary of the judgment: “What makes it so sad is that the whole concept of postal vot-
ing on demand is based on a demonstrably false premise. Ease of voting has really nothing to do
with it (…) It's not how you vote that brings out the voters. It's the choices you are given”.
Stuart Wilks-Heeg
Liverpool
March 2008
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Executive Summary
Purity of Elections in theUK
Key Findings
• Experienced election observers have raised serious concerns about how well UK election
procedures measure up to international standards.
• There have been at least 42 convictions for electoral fraud in the UK in the period
2000–2007.
• Greater use of postal voting has made UK elections far more vulnerable to fraud and
resulted in several instances of large-scale fraud.
• There is widespread, and justifiable, concern about both the comprehensiveness and the
accuracy of the UK’s electoral registers – the poor state of the registers potentially
compromises the integrity of the ballot.
• There is a genuine risk of electoral integrity being threatened by previously robust
systems of electoral administration having reached ‘breaking point’ as a result of
pressures imposed in recent years.
• Public confidence in the electoral process in the UK was the lowest in Western Europe in
1997, and has almost certainly declined further as a result of the extension of postal
voting.
• The benefits of postal and electronic voting have been exaggerated, particularly in
relation to claims about increased turnout and social inclusion.
• There is substantial evidence to suggest that money can have a powerful impact on the
outcome of general elections, particularly where targeted at marginal constituencies
over sustained periods of time.
• Outside of ministerial circles, there is a widespread view that a fundamental overhaul of
UK electoral law, administration and policy is urgently required.
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Free and fair elections?
Current controversies about the integrity of elections in the UK are without precedent in recent
British political history. During the past decade, views on electoral procedures in the UK have
moved from a broad consensus in favour of ‘modernising’ reforms to a highly polarised debate
centred on competing claims about the extent of electoral malpractice and the degree to which
ballot secrecy and security are being compromised.
The government’s perspective, summarised in the recent ‘Governance of Britain’ Green Paper,
is that it “has extended the use of postal voting with appropriate safeguards”, as part of wider
efforts “to make voting more convenient”. This governmental insistence that appropriate safe-
guards are inplacehas createdagrowing impasse in its relationshipwith theElectoralCommission,
which has repeatedly called formore stringentmeasures to enhance ballot security. Meanwhile,
other reviews of UK electoral processes have raised serious concerns about how well UK elec-
tion procedures measure up to international standards. These reviews include the Gould report
on the 2007Scottish elections,which suggested that voters hadbeen treated “as an afterthought”,
and a Council of Europe monitoring report which concluded that British elections “are very vul-
nerable to electoral fraud”.
Patterns of electoral malpractice
Anestimated42 convictions for electoral offencesweremade from2000–2007. It is unlikely that
there has been a significant increase in electoralmalpractice since the introduction of postal vot-
ing on demand in 2000; available figures suggest that 32 convictions were made from 1994–99.
In both periods, the offences arose almost exclusively from local elections, and related to a tiny
proportion of all elections contested. However, cases tried since 2000 underline that the exten-
sion of postal voting has clearly enhanced the vulnerability of UK elections to large-scale fraud.
The likelihood of such fraud occurring could – and should – have been predicted on the basis of
evidence of growing proxy vote fraud during the 1990s. Moreover, the potential for the political
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“The United Kingdom delivers democratic elections despite the
vulnerabilities in its electoral system. These vulnerabilities
could easily affect the overall democratic nature of future
elections in Great Britain.” Council of Europe (2008)
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control of a major city council or the outcome of a contest for parliamentary constituency to be
determined by ‘stolen votes’ has been clearly demonstrated by recent fraud cases, most notably
the offences considered by the Birmingham election court in 2005.
Concerns about potential electoral malpractice are not restricted to metropolitan areas. Since
2000, accusationsof electoralmalpractice havebeen investigatedbyeverypolice force in England,
with the exception of the City of London police. Convictions for electoral fraud, which represent
a small proportion of the cases reported to police forces, have been brought against represen-
tatives of all threemajor parties, aswell asminor parties such as theBritishNational Party.While
the majority of prosecutions for electoral offences concern white males, several cases have
involved proven instances of large-scale vote-rigging within British Pakistani and Bangladeshi
communities. There is some anecdotal evidence to suggest that practices associated with tradi-
tional forms of Pakistani ‘clan politics’ have been a common factor in a significant minority of
recent prosecutions for electoral fraud.
There is no evidence to date suggesting that electoral malpractice has occurred as a result of
pilots of various forms of electronic voting. However, serious questions about the security of
electronic voting fromorganised fraud remainunanswered.Meanwhile, pilots of electronic count-
ing have revealed multiple instances of votes being counted incorrectly.
The legacies of electoral modernisation
Current concerns about electoral integrity stem directly from reforms intended to modernise
the electoral process, provide voterswith greater convenience and choice, and increase turnout.
Since 2000, these objectives have primarily been promoted through the availability of postal-
voting on demand and pilots of all-postal voting and various forms of electronic voting.
Evidence suggests that the benefits of electoral modernisation have been exaggerated. Postal
voting has proved popular with some voters, resulting in a steady rise in the take up of postal
voting on demand. However, while the use of postal voting has an immediate, beneficial impact
on turnout, it also appears that the ‘turnout premium’ levels off and then declines at subsequent
elections. There is no evidence at all to suggest that electronic voting raises turnout. While pop-
ularwith thosewhohave used it, e-voting principally appears to constitute a costly exercise in pro-
viding greater choice to voters who would otherwise have voted by post or at a polling station.
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The state of the registers
There are major failings evident in relation to the state of the UK’s electoral registers. Without
comprehensive registration of voters, the objective ofmaximising electoral participation is imme-
diately compromised.While estimates that up to ten per cent of eligible voters are absent from the
electoral registerare frequentlycited, such figureshave littleornoauthority, andrecentpilot research
in London suggests that in some areas up to one third of eligible voters may be unregistered.
However, the tendency for registers to contain inaccurate information, including cases where
the voter is deceased, fictitious or registered inmultiple localities, is widely recognised. There is
no sound basis from which to estimate the extent of inaccuracies on the registers. The Council
of Europe’s recent investigation of theUKelectoral systemargued that it was vulnerable to fraud
largely because of its “rather arcane systemof voter registration”, based upon a systemof house-
hold, rather than individual, registration.
Money and themarginals
It is widely recognised that money can have a significant impact on electoral outcomes. The
UK’s non-proportional electoral system tends to prompt parties to channel financial resources
to a relatively small number of marginal constituencies. The same pattern is increasingly evi-
dent in relation to donations to constituency parties. Evidence relating to the 2005 General
Election suggests that highly targeted spending, much of it committed in advance of the official
campaign period, clearly impacted on results in a number of marginal seats. This approach is
most clearly associated with the Conservative Party, which is in a unique position to attract and
channel large-scale donations from a small number of wealthy individuals to support campaigns
in marginal seats. Although legal, such practices clearly exploit a ‘loophole’ in existing regulations
and indicate the potential for a general election outcome to be significantly influenced by a small
number of large-scale donors making funds available to target ‘swing voters’ in marginal seats.
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“It does not take an experienced election observer, or election
fraudster, to see that the combination of the household
registration system without personal identifiers and the postal
vote on demand arrangements make the election system in
Great Britain very vulnerable to electoral fraud.”
Council of Europe (2008, p.12)
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There are significant factors influencing levels of turnout, particularly in general elections, which
have been seriously neglected by debates concerning electoral processes over the past decade.
Most significantly, there is powerful statistical evidence, assembled frommultiple general elec-
tions, to suggest a strong correlation between candidate campaign spending and the number of
votes cast for that candidate. There is wider evidence to suggest that turnout is best promot-
ed by political parties engaging with the electorate rather than simply by rendering voting
‘more convenient’.
Legislative failings and administrative frailty
Since 2000, UK electoral legislation has had to play ‘catch up’, with the reality of the electoral
process being rendered more vulnerable to fraud through the extension of postal voting. The
provisions introduced by the Electoral Administration Act 2006 fall short of what is required to
ensure that electoral malpractice is kept to an absolute minimum. Just as problematic, however,
has been the tendency formajor legal changes to be introducedwithinmonths of elections taking
place, thereby placing enormous pressures on highly localised systemsof electoral administration.
The extensionof postal voting and thepiloting of all-postal voting have exposed significantweak-
nesses in the capacity of the printing industry, while pilots of e-voting and e-counting have
highlighted ongoing problems with existing software and hardware. There have been numerous
instances in which problems arising from the administration andmanagement of elections have
come close to leaving electoral outcomes open to challenge. The ‘general election that never
was’, in Autumn 2007, served to highlight many of the serious problems facing electoral admin-
istrators. There is a near-universal consensus among electoral administrators that, had an elec-
tion been called for November 2007, significant administrative problems would have arisen,
perhaps on a scale that could have raised questions about the legitimacy of the election result.
This ‘lucky escape’ underlines the need for a major review of electoral procedures and process-
es in the UK.
Falling public confidence
Public confidence in the electoral process in theUKwas already very lowbyWest European stan-
dards in 1997. There is clear evidence to suggest that public confidence in UK electionsmay have
declined further over the past decade. Surveys conducted on behalf of the Electoral Commission
show an increase in the proportion of electors regarding postal voting as being “very or fairly
unsafe from fraud” from34per cent in 2004 to46per cent in 2005.More in-depth survey research
for the 2004 all-postal pilots revealed that while 71 per cent of voters in non-pilot areas regard-
ed postal voting as safe, only 51 per cent of voters in pilot areas felt this was the case. Among
British Asian voters in 2004, the proportion regarding postal voting as safe was just 46 per cent.
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“In many areas of the UK we have noted concerns that the
current structure for the delivery of electoral administration
is close to breaking point and we believe it is insufficiently
robust and coordinated to meet the challenges of elections in
the twenty-first century.” Electoral Commission (2007)
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Moving towards solutions: lessons fromNorthern Ireland
It is difficult to refute the view recently expressed by the former Chair of the Committee on
Standards in Public Life that the government appears to be “in denial” about the challenges to
the integrity of UK elections. In November 2007, the government reiterated its determination
to continue with its “electoral modernisation strategy”, using existing legislative provisions and
further piloting of alternative electoral arrangements. By contrast, the Electoral Commission has
called for electoral pilots to cease and has begun its own detailed review of the current legal and
policy frameworks for elections in the UK. Outside of ministerial circles, there is widespread
appetite for such a debate.
The possibility cannot be dismissed that root and branch reform of British electoral law and
administration is required, as opposed to further consolidation of legislation and administrative
procedures originating in the nineteenth century. The nature of this task may be less onerous
than it would seem. It has been widely noted in recent reviews of UK election procedures that
many viable solutions to the problems that have emerged in recent years are already in place in
one part of the UK. Over the past decade, electoral reforms introduced in Northern Ireland have
provided formore accurate electoral registers, strengthened the role of electoral administration,
sharply reduced accusations ofmalpractice, and raised public confidence in the electoral process.
The task of emulating these achievements in mainland Britain is the key challenge facing elec-
toral policy today.
“The most important challenge facing all of those involved in running
elections (…) is to reaffirm a shared commitment to putting electors
at the heart of electoral policy and decision-making”
Electoral Commission (2007)
0 20 40 60 80 100
Percentage expressing full confidence in election outcomes in
six West European countries, 1997-2002
Denmark (98)
Sweden (98)
Germany (98)
Netherlands (98)
Spain (96)
Great Britain (97)
INTRODUCTION 13
TheGeneral Election that neverwas
In early October 2007, media speculation about a possible ‘snap election’ had reached its peak,
with rumours of a possible Autumn poll having first emerged inmid-August. The 10 o’clock news
broadcast on BBC Radio 4 on Thursday 4 October opened, unsurprisingly, with an item weigh-
ing up the likelihood of an election being called for early November. The lead item was immedi-
ately followed by a bulletin about the nation-wide postal strike, scheduled to take place until
Tuesday 9October. By Saturday 7October, GordonBrownhad announced his decision not to call
a general election. By contrast, talks between the Royal Mail and the Communication Workers
Union initially proved far less conclusive. An agreement bringing the end to the official strike
action was subsequently reached on Friday 12 October, although a number of localised wildcat
strikes persisted well into October, most notably in Merseyside and London. By mid-October
time, a considerable backlog of mail had built up and it was not until 15th November that the
Royal Mail was able to confirm that it had largely cleared the backlog, other than in parts of
London, Surrey, Merseyside and Cheshire (Royal Mail, 2007).
Little, if any, connection wasmade between these two sets of events in the days before, or after,
election speculation was finally cut short. Yet, in the week before the 2005 General Election a
total of 5,362,501 ballot papers had been delivered to voters by the Royal Mail. Over three-quar-
ters of these ballot papers, dispatched as a further 4,110,039 items ofmail, reached returning offi-
cers in time to be included for consideration in election count across theUK. As of 15thNovember
2007, a full twoweeks after the likely date of the ‘General Election that neverwas’, the RoyalMail
was still advising “customers planning large mailings … to speak to their usual Royal Mail con-
tact, whowill have themost up-to-date information, andwill be able to help planmailings around
any remaining backlogs” (Royal Mail, 2007).
Had an election been called, it is unclear how the risk would have been handled of millions of
voters being potentially disenfranchised by the aftermath of the postal dispute. More signifi-
cantly, however, the postal dispute was by nomeans the only serious problem raised by the pos-
sibility of a snap election. Perhaps more so than with any recent general election, the ‘General
Election that neverwas’ inNovember 2007 revealedmultiple issues of concern about procedures
for elections in the UK, and the principles underpinning them. These issues went far beyond the
“One minute after the polls closed in May we told the government about
our grave concerns. And at the end of last week, I sent a note to the
Ministry of Justice saying that those difficulties still exist and asking how
we could overcome them. The message needs to get out that there’s the
possibility of problems that could affect the conduct of the election.”
John Turner, Chief Executive of the Association of Electoral Administrators (AEA),
quoted in Scotland on Sunday, 30 September 2007
Introduction:
A tale of twoelections
long-standing, and legitimate, complaint that the absence of fixed parliamentary terms pro-
vides the incumbent with an automatic advantage in any general election. In the period of fren-
zied media speculation between the initial rumours of a ‘snap’ election and the eventual
announcement that no electionwould take place, serious doubtswere expressed aboutwhether
the administrative capacity existed to run a general election at such short notice. Notably, such
concerns received negligible attention in comparison to media coverage regarding the possible
date of a forthcoming election.
The overwhelming concern expressed by returning officers in the midst of election speculation
was that the likely period of an autumn election campaign would have coincided with the tim-
ing of the annual canvas through which electoral registers are updated locally. Senior election
administrators estimated that around 1million voters could have beendisenfranchised as a result,
in addition to the estimated 3.5 million eligible voters who are not on the register. At the same
time, problems experienced at the May 2007 local elections had revealed the significant pres-
sures imposed on electoral administrators by factors such as constant legislative changes, short
election time-frames, ongoing problems with suppliers and a general inadequacy of resources.
Reflecting on these difficulties, the Chief Executive of the AEA, John Turner, warned that an
Autumn 2007 General Election would “probably be the worst in living memory” (BBC, 2007).
Whether the concerns raised by electoral administrators had any significant influence onGordon
Brown’s decision to wait for a general election is unclear. It is more likely that opinion polls and
other intelligence from the key Labour-Conservativemarginals reignited Labour’s concerns about
the impact of Conservative initiatives intended to boost levels of support for their candidates in
target seats. Bymid-2007 there was growing evidence of the impact of the Conservatives’ strat-
egy of targeting additional resource on local parties and candidates inmarginal seats. It is almost
certain that local polls taken in such seats (even more so than national polls showing a rise in
support for the Conservatives) were the most critical factor influencing Gordon Brown’s deci-
sion not to call an election. Had an election been called, there can be no doubt that it would
have principally constituted a ‘battle for the marginals’, dominated by the two main parties’
attempts to secure the support of around 8,000 ‘swing voters’ across as few as 30–35 parlia-
mentary seats (Electoral ReformSociety, 2007). As Polly Toynbee noted, onwhat could have been
themorning after the 2007General Election, the implications of a general election being fought
on these terms are as worrying as they are profound:
“In recent elections the battleground was minuscule – around 200,000 votes in marginal con-
stituencies. But now the number has shrunk to vanishingly small: imagine each party target-
ing its entire election budget on just this handful of people, anointed by geographical accident
to be the nation's kingmakers.” (Guardian, 2 November 2007).
There can be little doubt, then, that the eventual decision not to call an election in Autumn 2007
represented a ‘lucky escape’ for British democracy. But, the problems thatwould almost certainly
have conspired to render the 2007 election “the worst in living memory” have not disappeared.
Neither will these issues be resolved simply by reverting to the convention for springtime elec-
tions; the concerns highlightedby the ‘General Election that neverwas’ are not the political equiv-
alent of ‘Seasonal Affective Disorder’. The problems undermining British electoral practices are
far more deep-rooted. The questionwe need to ask, in themost simple terms, is “how did we get
into thismess?” To answer that question, we need to begin with the tale of another general elec-
tion, although in this case, one which very definitely took place: the landmark General Election
of 1997.
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1997 and all that
If the 1997 General Election represented a landmark event in British post-war electoral politics,
it was not simply because 18 years of Conservative rule were ended by a Labour landslide. The
1997 electionbroke several records all at once. Labour’s 179 seatmajority in theHouseofCommons
was the largest achieved by any party in the post-war era. But the size of themajority also reflect-
ed the fact that the 1997 election produced the least proportional result since 1945: Labour’s 43.3
per cent of the votes translated into 63.3 per cent of seats in theCommons. The claim to the result
representing a landslide was also tempered by the fact that the turnout of 71.4 per cent was the
lowest since 1945. Perhaps most remarkable of all, particularly set against the drop in turnout,
the 1997 campaign constituted, by a largemargin, themost expensive in post-war history – cost-
ing the three main parties a combined £80 million in today’s prices.
In the aftermath of Labour’s victory, the issues raised by the slump in turnout and the sharp rise
in campaign spending figuredprominently on thenewgovernment’s agenda.Meanwhile, Labour’s
manifesto commitment to hold a referendumon “a proportional alternative to the first-past-the-
post system”was quietly pushed into the background. Instead, turnout rapidly became the over-
riding concern, particularly after the local elections of 1998 and the European elections of 1999
recorded turnouts of 28 and 24 per cent respectively, thereby setting new records for the low-
est levels of electoral participation in living memory. It was in this context that a Working Party
on Electoral Procedures, led by George Howarth MP, was established in 1998, with a remit to
make recommendations for reforms to electoral law for which cross-party support could be
demonstrated. At the same time, the Home Affairs Select Committee began its own review of
electoral law and administration. Both reviews published their reports during 1999, reaching
broadly common conclusions. In short, it was held that ‘modernising’ electoral practices would
bring them into linewithwider social change, render the act of votingmore convenient and there-
by serve to increase turnout.
The issueof party spending at the 1997General Election, togetherwith the concerns about ‘sleaze’
inBritish politics that had alsopeakedat the election, also remainedhighon the agenda.Alongside
the Howarth review of electoral procedures, a separate review of the funding of political parties
was carried out by the Committee on Standards in Public Life (1998), chaired by Lord Neill, amid
growing calls for the introduction of new regulations concerning expenditure on general elec-
tion campaigns. The terms of the review reflected widespread agreement that more transpar-
ent, independentlymonitoredprocedures relating to the finances of political partieswere required
in order to address concerns about declining public confidence in the integrity of party politics.
In both cases, the recommendations arising from the reviewswere translated swiftly and almost
wholesale into primary legislation. Specific proposals for changes to electoral procedures, par-
ticularly those contained in the Howarth review, formed the basis for the Representation of the
People Act (RPA) 2000. The Act introduced significant changes to electoral processes, including
the introduction of postal voting on demand and provision for local piloting of various other
forms of electoral ‘modernisation’, such as electronic voting and electronic counting. During the
same year, the passage of the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act (PPERA) 2000
took forwardmany of the recommendations of theNeill Committee’s report. PPERA 2000 intro-
duced new regulations relating to party finances and the financing of election campaigns. This
Act also formally created an independent body, the Electoral Commission, established with a
remit to monitor the electoral process and advise on electoral law, promote political participa-
tion, andmaintain registers of donations to political parties and spending on election campaigns.
The two Acts represented major additions to the legal framework for UK elections, constituting
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themost significant reforms to electoral law inmore than 100 years. The desirability of securing
cross-party consensus for change was therefore evident, as Jack Straw MP, as Home Secretary,
was at pains to point out when moving the second reading of the Representation of the People
Bill in November 1999:
“Theworking party on electoral procedures (…) included representatives of all the principal polit-
ical parties, electoral administrators and representatives of local government. I am pleased to
say that the working party was able to proceed by consensus (…) I hope that a similar spirit of
co-operation will characterise our deliberations over the Bill. Electoral law is so fundamental
to our democracy that changes to it should, wherever possible, proceed by consensus.”
(Hansard, 30 Nov 1999: Column 160)
Electoral modernisation: from consensus to controversy
In 2000, the developing consensus about the desirability of new legislation governing elections,
particularly provisions for various forms of ‘remote voting’, extended far beyond the political par-
ties. The measures found particular support within local government and the search for ways of
raising turnout was broadly welcomed by the press, attracting limited criticism from journalists.
The case for postal voting, in particular, was felt by many observers to have been proven virtu-
ally beyonddoubtwithinmonths of RPA2000 receivingRoyal Assent. The first, small-scale pilots
of all-postal voting at theMay 2000 local elections appeared to highlight the potential for a dra-
matic increase in turnout. Postal voting was shown to increase turnout in areas as diverse as
Wigan and Stevenage, with a particularly dramatic increase in Gateshead, where turnout in two
wards was doubled, reaching almost 60 per cent, through the use of all-postal ballots. Yet, amid
the rush to embrace electoral modernisation, some dissenting voices could already be heard,
particularly among specialists in electoral law. The Conservative party’s former advisor on elec-
toral law, Paul Gribble, was one of the first to go public with his concerns. Writing in the Daily
Telegraphdays after theMay 2000elections,Gribble highlighted the problems experiencedwith
electronic counting in the elections to the Greater London Authority, suggesting that greater
legal safeguards would be required to prevent misconduct:
“I am not suggesting for a moment that our elections are not among the most trustworthy in
the world. But there is a danger, because of certain changes taking place, that British elections
as we know them will never be the same again, and that they may not continue to be seen to
be free and fair. Extensive reforms are under way that will alter many vital aspects of election
procedures. Some of them will reduce the opportunities for the procedures to be fully scruti-
nised and could well increase the opportunities for unscrupulous individuals to cheat the sys-
tem.” (Daily Telegraph, 9 May 2000)
Gribble constituted something of a lone voice inMay 2000. But, over the course of the next four
years, his early concerns were increasingly added to by emerging critics of the reforms. One
year on, the investigative journalist Nick Davies, reporting on existing evidence of electoral mis-
conduct in the UK, warned that changes to electoral procedures were “at best over-confident
and at worst like an invitation to corruption” (Guardian, 9 May 2001). By 2003, the Electoral
Commission, while continuing to support the case for postal voting, had become increasingly
concerned about issues of ballot security. The Electoral Commission (2003b) called for more
robust security measures for postal voting, legislation defining new offences concerned with
postal ballots, greater powers for prosecutors, and the introduction of individual voter registra-
tion. Governmentministers resisted the proposals, instead pushing aheadwith its own plans for
all-postal pilots across four English regions at the combined European Parliament and local elec-
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tions in June 2004, despite the serious reservations expressed by the Electoral Commission and
subsequently amplified by the House of Lords.
The 2004 pilots were to prove a crucial turning-point in the debate, not least because the atti-
tude of the media towards postal voting began to develop a more critical, and increasingly
investigative, edge. In the run up to the 2004 local elections, the local and national press ranmul-
tiple stories highlighting the potential for serious administrative problems, including the enor-
mous pressures being placed on the printing industry and the postal service. Of even greater
concern, however, was the sharp rise in media reporting of allegations of potential fraud associ-
ated with postal ballots. While few such allegations of fraud were ultimately investigated by
police,widespreadpress coverageof the issue hadgiven growing credence to the view that postal
voting was vulnerable to fraud. Most significantly, one of the few cases that were ultimately
brought to court in relation to the 2004 local elections demonstrated unequivocally the scope
for organised electoral fraud to be committed on a large scale where all-postal ballots were
used. In May 2005, six Labour Party members were found guilty of tampering with possibly
thousands of postal ballots in elections for theAston andBordersleyGreenwards of Birmingham
City Council.
As the media widely reported at the time, in reaching his verdict on the Aston and Bordersley
Green election petitions, Judge Richard Mawrey QC suggested that the evidence pointed to a
level of organised fraud “that would disgrace a banana republic”. The text ofMawrey’s judgment
reads as a damning critique of the security of postal voting and, particularly, the lack of safe-
guards designed to prevent electoral fraud.Uncompromising, direct and, at times, almost polem-
ical in style, the written judgment arguably still represents the most detailed analysis of the
vulnerability of postal voting to organised fraud. In an Afterword to the executive summary of
the judgment, Mawrey took issue with a governmental statement asserting that “the systems
already in place to deal with the allegations of electoral fraud are clearly working”:
“(95.) Anybody who has just sat through the case I have just tried and listened to the evidence
of electoral fraud that would disgrace a banana republic would find this statement sur-
prising. To assert that ‘the systems already in place to deal with the allegations of elec-
toral fraud are clearlyworking’ indicates a state not simply of complacency but of denial.
(96.) The system to deal with fraud are not working well. They are not working badly. The fact
is that there are no systems to deal realistically with fraud and there never have been.
Until there are, fraud will continue unabated. (Paragraph numbering and emphasis in
original)
The tone of the judgment delivered by Mawrey also reflected a wider shift in the debate sur-
rounding electoral modernisation. Within five years of the passage of RPA 2000, broad consen-
sus had given way to controversy. As a result, the debate surrounding electoral procedures and
electoral lawhas become increasingly polarised.Onone side of the divide, a range of critical voic-
es, drawn from the ranks of legal experts, senior police officers, journalists and academics, have
expressed serious concerns about the security of postal voting, pointing to apparent flaws in
the system and to widespread allegations of fraud. In a letter to the Electoral Commission in
2005, Chief Superintendent Dave Murray of Thames Valley Police suggested that “the applica-
tion procedure to allow individuals to have a postal vote in Local, European and National elec-
tions is superficial, cursory and flawed” (Thames Valley Police, 2005). Writing in the Times on 21
January 2007, the academic Michael Pinto-Duschinksy (2007) suggested that it was clear that
“there are problems of electoralmalpractice in a considerable number of British cities”. Speaking
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on Newsnight on BBC 2 on 31 October 2007, the former Chair of the Committee on Standards in
Public Life, Sir Alistair Graham suggested that the Committee had been “deeply shocked about
the denial not only in the (Electoral) Commission, but also in the then Department for
Constitutional Affairs, about the scale of postal vote fraud and the fact that nobody was moni-
toring what the scale of that fraud was”.
On the other side of the divide, the Government has continued to argue that the evidence of
electoralmisconduct is negligible and that appropriate safeguards are in place to protect against
electoral fraud, particularly following the Electoral Administration Act 2006. The government’s
perspective, summarised in the recent ‘Governance of Britain’ Green Paper, is therefore that it
“has extended the use of postal voting with appropriate safeguards”, as part of wider efforts “to
make votingmore convenient”. The stance is also clearly reflected in the government’s response
to theElectoralCommission’s recommendations arising fromtheMay2007electoral pilot schemes,
which had raised numerous concerns about the continuation of such pilots. Having dismissed
virtually all of the Commission’s most significant concerns, the Government’s response reiter-
ated that its objective remained to:
“achieve a future voting process that promotes a convenient range of choices to eligible people
and maximum effectiveness and efficiency, without compromising accessibility and security.”
(Ministry of Justice, 2007. p.9)
As is often typical of polarised argument, the debate surrounding the purity of UK elections
have become dogged by serious shortcomings. From the outset, there has been little or no ref-
erence to any clear statement of principles for ensuring the integrity of elections. Instead, the
starting point for discussion has always been the case for electoral modernisation, a project jus-
tified almost entirely by concerns about falling turnouts.While some critics havemade reference
to general principles of electoral integrity, such as ballot secrecy and equality of the vote, such
principles have, astonishingly, been pushed to the periphery of the debate in recent years. Just
as worryingly, much of the discussion has taken place alongside a void of research, meaning that
debate has rarely been founded on systematic evidence and informed analysis. Rather, govern-
ment has regarded the lack of evidence of fraud as an indicator of the purity of elections, when
it really reflects an absence of data. Critics,meanwhile, have too often resorted to anecdote, con-
jecture and media-generated exposure of apparent flaws in electoral procedures.
As the remainder of this report seeks to demonstrate, these failings are by no means insur-
mountable. There are general, widely held principles, used as a basis for international standards,
against which we may seek to assess the integrity of electoral processes in the UK. Despite the
serious lack of existing research on electoral malpractice, there is also enough of an evidence
base to offer at least an initial assessment of the extent to which UK elections conform to these
standards. And, for all that it has been caught in the crossfire between electoralmodernisers and
their discontents, the enormous bodyof research, data and analysis produced and commissioned
by the Electoral Commission since 2000 provides a rich source of data for such an exercise. It is
to the evidence base which the report now turns, beginning with an assessment of the extent to
which UK elections conform to international standards for democratic elections.
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The integrity of elections: international standards
If there is disagreement within the UK regarding the integrity of its own electoral processes,
there is, by contrast, widespread international consensus regarding the principles associated
with free and fair democratic elections (Democratic Audit, 2001; Electoral Commission, 2007).
The core principles, enshrined in both the ‘Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ and the
‘International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’, are those of periodic elections, universal
suffrage, equality of the vote, and the secret ballot. From this notion of a human right to demo-
cratic freedoms, more detailed statements outlining the general conditions for the purity and
integrity of democratic elections have beendevelopedby international organisations. As a result,
a clear and consistent set of standards for the conduct of elections internationallymaybe derived
from the various handbooks supplied to election observation missions (United Nations, 2005;
SIDA, undated; IDEA, 1997; OSCE/ODIHR, 2005). The principles laid down in these handbooks
derive in large part from the ‘Declaration on Criteria for Free and Fair Elections’, adopted by the
Inter-Parliamentary Union in 1994. The Declaration specifies that elections should be:
• held at regular intervals, based on principles of universal suffrage, the equality of the
vote and the secret ballot;
• governedby impartial procedures for registering voters,managing elections and count-
ing votes, which also guarantee the security and transparency of the electoral process;
• free from all forms of violence, fear and intimidation, and secure from fraud and other
forms of malpractice;
• supported by wider freedoms of assembly, association and speech, along with open
access to the media;
• and underpinned by legislative, policy and institutional frameworks which provide for
fair and open competition between political parties, including possible regulation of
party funding and election spending.
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ChapterOne:
Free and fair elections?
“The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of
government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine
elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall
be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.”
Article 21 (3) of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights
“Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity (…) to vote
and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by
universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot,
guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors.”
Extract from Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
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That such widely accepted generic conditions for elections to be adjudged ‘free and fair’ should
feature rarely as an explicit feature of current debate surrounding UK elections will perhaps be
unsurprising to anyone familiarwith theworkings of theBritish constitution. Aswithmanyother
aspects of thepolitical process, theprinciples guidingdemocratic elections in theUKhavebecome
an assumed part of Britain’s unwritten constitution and an essentially implicit feature of consti-
tutional law. There have, however, been several attempts to evaluate the extent to which inter-
nationally recognised democratic principles are entrenched in British electoral procedures. As
the following section suggests, there is a growing tendency for such studies to raise serious
concerns about the impact of recent electoral reforms in the UK.
DoUK electionsmeet agreed international standards?
Since the early 1990s, the work of Democratic Audit has sought to provide a comprehensive
assessment of the extent to which British political processes measure up against a variety of
established international standards for democracy and used these to define a set of ‘Democratic
Audit criteria’ (Weir and Beetham, 1999; Beetham et al, 2002). While critical of multiple aspects
of British democracy, the analyses produced by Democratic Audit in 1999 and 2002 raised rela-
tively few concerns in relation to the criteria derived from international standards for the prin-
ciples and procedures governing democratic elections in the UK. Indeed, at the end of the 1990s
Democratic Audit assessment of electoral processes was largely positive: “we found that
national elections in the UK largelymet international human rights standards, being held at reg-
ular intervals by almost wholly secret ballot, and being free of bribery, intimidation and other
abuses” (Weir andBeetham, 1999, p.41).However, despite declaring a generally cleanbill of health,
Democratic Audit did identify three general concerns. First, it was suggested that ballot-tracing
“(…) the authority of the government can only derive from the will of the people
as expressed in genuine, free and fair elections held at regular intervals on the
basis of universal, equal and secret suffrage”.
“Every adult citizen has the right to access to an effective, impartial and non-
discriminatory procedure for the registration of voters”.
“The right to vote in secret is absolute and shall not be restricted in any manner
whatsoever”.
“States should (…) provide for the formation and free functioning of political
parties, possibly regulate the fundingofpolitical parties andelectoral campaigns
(…)”.
“State authorities should ensure the integrity of the ballot through appropriate
measures to prevent multiple voting or voting by those not entitled (…) and (…)
shouldensure that theballot is conducted soas toavoid fraudorother illegality”.
Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union (1994)
Selected extracts from the Inter-Parliamentary Union’s
Declaration on Criteria for Free and Fair Elections
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mechanisms potentially undermined the secrecy of the ballot. Second, falling rates of voter reg-
istrationwere regarded as the effective disenfranchisement of a significantminority of the elec-
torate, particularly those from socially excluded groups. Third, concerns were raised about the
legal denial of votes to prisoners, together with the effective denial of votes to some elderly and
disabled people as a result of defective provisions for postal and proxy votes.
The over-riding issues of concern raised by Democratic Audit in 1999 related to wider aspects of
electoral politics about which international standards are far less specific. First, there were sig-
nificant concerns raised about the influence of campaign spending on electoral outcomes, par-
ticularly at a time when concerns about ‘sleaze’ in British politics had become paramount. Here,
it was noted that the enforcement of local limits on campaign spending had received far less
attention than concerns about unregulated national election spending, despite the strong cor-
relation between local campaign spending and votes gained (Weir andBeetham, 1999).Moreover,
Democratic Audit suggested that existing regulations relating to local campaign spending were
seriously deficient in preventing abuse:
“It is known that the limits on local expenditure were being circumvented on a large scale prior
to the Representation of the People Act 1989, which quadrupled the limits in an effort to cur-
tail abuse. Genuine uncertainties aboutwhat counts and does not count as local election expen-
diture abound.The costs of national poster and advertising campaigns, the visits of party leaders,
the increasing use of telephone banks at national level to chase voters in marginal constituen-
cies, all raise unresolved issues of illegality.” (Weir and Beetham, 1999, p.90)
Second, Democratic Audit paid particular attention to the effects of the UK’s non-proportional
electoral system, which was seen to undermine the basic notion of political equality that “every
elector’s vote should count for one, and none for more than one” (Weir and Beetham, 1999,
p.45). Given the significance of specific individual constituency contests for the overall out-
come of general elections, Democratic Audit also highlighted concerns about the possible polit-
ical manipulation of boundary review processes through which the geography of parliamentary
seats was determined. The Audit also noted that the nature of the electoral system could not be
divorced from the issues of campaign finance highlighted above, since itwas the character of the
electoral systemwhich led the parties to focus their attentions on swing voters inmarginal seats.
As such, enormous geographical variation could be observed in the extent towhich national cam-
paigns impingedon local parliamentary contests, with that variation hinging on the relative ‘mar-
ginality’ of a seat for each of the main parties. Taking Bootle and Kensington as the archetypal
safe seats for Labour and the Conservatives respectively, the authors note:
“‘Bootle Man’ and ‘Kensington Lady’ no doubt received their election addresses, courtesy of a
free mail service, but they were not solicited by direct mail, they were not telephoned six times
during the campaign, their view were not sought nor their fears assuaged, they were not invit-
ed to an intimate question-and-answer session with a party leader. Such privileged status was
reserved for the ‘swing voters’.” (Weir and Beetham, 1999, p.66)
While Democratic Audit’s third major review of democracy in the UK (2002) continued to raise
major concerns about the nature of the electoral system and its broader ramifications for party
politics, the broadly positive assessment of underlying election processes was largely repeated
(Beetham et al, 2002). Indeed, by 2002,DemocraticAudit hadbegun to take the view that reforms
introduced by RPA 2000 and PPERA 2000 offered clear potential to strengthen the democratic
quality of electionprocedures. RPA2000was seen tohave “righted somewrongs thatDemocratic
Audit noted in 1996 and 1999’ (p.89) particularly as it had made “procedures for registration and
voting easier and more inclusive” (p.294). Meanwhile, the establishment of the Electoral
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Commission was welcomed for its potential to overcome concerns about political manipulation
of electoral boundaries, and for its role in overseeing a new legal framework requiring political
parties “to register with the Electoral Commission and conform to strict rules on finance and
expenditure” (p.294).
Democratic Audit’s relatively sanguine view of UK electoral processes was thus accompanied by
amuchclearer healthwarning about the influenceofwider forces impactingonelections.However,
subsequent reports assessing UK elections against the same international standards have
raisedmore fundamental concerns about British electoral procedures. The electoral observation
report completed by theOffice forDemocratic Institutions andHumanRights, following its invi-
tation to observe the 2005 General Election, pointed to a number of areas in which internation-
al norms were potentially being breached. In addition to the potential human rights violations
raised by the denial of the vote to convicted prisoners and the provision for ballot tracing, the
ODIHR report pointed to the absence of checks for multiple registration, and raised major con-
cerns about the challenges which postal voting on demand presented in relation to the secrecy
and the integrity of the ballot. In the report’s executive summary it was suggested that:
“The introduction of postal voting on demand in 2000, without the need to present a reason
for the application, has demonstrated the vulnerability of any trust based electoral process (…)
Although the legal and administrative procedures in this regard appear to have been devel-
oped to prioritise enfranchisement, the issue of postal voting raised lingering doubts about the
ability to securely regulate this aspect of the process.” (OSCE/ODIHR, 2005, p.1)
Some of ODIHR’s recommendations were addressed by the Electoral Administration Act 2006.
Most notably, the need to ensure compliance with Paragraph 8 of the 1990 OSCE Copenhagen
Document, which establishes that electoral observers should be permitted access to all stages
of the election process, has now been addressed. Yet, the majority of the report’s recommenda-
tions, including the consolidation and simplification of electoral law and the possible introduc-
tion of requirement for voters to produce ID, have yet to be taken up by government. In the
meantime, further interventions from independent observers during 2007 have significantly
added to the list of ways in which UK elections may fail to meet up to established democratic
norms.
2007: a bad year for the electorate
If the ‘general election that never was’ raised a series of hypothetical questions about the puri-
ty of UK elections, 2007 also gave rise to numerous concrete examples of problems with British
electoral processes. During the course of the year, three separate electoral monitoring reports
were prepared, each ofwhich raised serious concerns about the integrity of British elections. The
origins of, and the issues raised by, these reports may be summarised as follows:
TheCouncil of EuropeMonitoringCommittee report: Following a motion proposed by David
WilshireMP in June 2006, the Council of Europe’sMonitoring Committee established an Inquiry
led by Herta Däubler-Gmelin and Urdzula Gacek to investigate whether evidence of electoral
fraud warranted UK elections to be subject to the Council of Europe’s monitoring procedure.
Following the visit of a Council of Europe delegation to the UK from 26–28 February 2007, and
subsequent referral of specific issues to the European Commission for Democracy through Law
(theVeniceCommission), a full reportwas issued on 22 January 2008.WhileDäubler-Gmelin and
Gacek’s (2008) report found that the UK had not ultimately “fallen short of honouring its dem-
ocratic commitments to the Council of Europe”, the authors raised major concerns about the
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vulnerability of UK elections to electoral fraud. In particular, “the, rather arcane, system of voter
registration” combinedwith the availability of postal voting on demand led Däubler-Gmelin and
Gacek (2008) to conclude that the United Kingdom “delivers democratic elections despite the
vulnerabilities in its electoral system” (p.1, emphasis in original).
The Open Rights Group’s report on the 2007 Scottish elections and the 2007 English local
election pilots: The Open Rights Group (ORG) is a not-for-profit organisation campaigning on
‘digital rights’ issues. Under the provisions contained in the Electoral Administration Act 2006,
ORG established an ElectionObservationMission to observe the English local elections and the
Scottish Parliamentary and local elections held in May 2007. The Mission focussed particularly
on issues raised by e-counting in Scotland and e-voting and e-counting pilots in England. ORG’s
subsequent (2007) report highlighted a number of serious concerns about the vulnerability of
e-voting and the accuracy of e-counting and alluded tomany of the problems subsequently iden-
tified in the Scottish elections by an independent review (see below). ORG concluded that “it
cannot express confidence in the results declared in the areas observed”.
The Gould report on the 2007 Scottish elections: On 23 October 2007 the independent
review of the Scottish elections of 2007 led by Ron Gould published its findings. The review had
been established in the immediate wake of a series of problems that emerged during the May
2007 elections for the Scottish Parliament, culminating in a dramatic increase in the number of
rejected ballot papers and problems with electronic counting hardware and software. Gould
(2007) identified serious problems relating to electoral legislation, electoral administration, bal-
lot paper design, and the poor planning underpinning the deployment of electronic-counting
technologies (see box 1.2 overleaf for a more detailed summary). The report concluded that
“voters were overlooked as the most important stakeholders to be considered at every stage of
the election”.
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Registered electors presenting themselves at polling stations in Scotland on 3
May 2007 were provided with two separate ballot papers, requiring them to
cast three setsof votes. The first ballotpaperwas for local council elections, using
the ‘single transferable vote’ system, and requiring voters to indicate ranked
preferences for candidates. The second ballot was a ‘combined’ ballot paper for
the Scottish Parliament elections using the ‘Alternative Member System’ (AMS).
Under AMS, electors cast a single vote for a constituency candidate and a single
vote for a regional party list.
On the morning of Friday 4 May 2007, media reports on the outcome of the
2007 Scottish elections were dominated by two main stories – the possibility of
the Scottish National Party (SNP) emerging as the largest party in the Scottish
Parliament, and the chaotic scenes that had dominated the count. With SNP
claiming a narrow victory, the events were described by one media source as
follows: ‘pollingdescended intochaoswith tensof thousands spoilt ballotpapers,
faulty counting machines and bad weather delaying the return of ballot boxes’
(Guardian Unlimited, 4 May 2007). While the outcome of the poll was ultimately
not challenged, initial speculation as to the causes of the problems experienced
was quickly followed by moves to conduct a more thorough investigation. In the
immediate aftermath of the election, the Electoral Commission announced that
an independent review would be established. Within a month, the review had
commenced, ledbyRonGould,Canada’s formerAssistantChief ElectoralOfficer.
With the review underway, James Mitchell and Christopher Carman of the
University of Strathclyde published a report providing further analysis of the
rejected ballots. Mitchell and Carman’s report drew comparisons with previous
Scottishelections, examined thedata relating to thecontrastingelectoral systems
used, and assessed the possible reasons for geographical variations in the
proportion of rejected ballots. While only 1 per cent of ballot papers had been
rejected in Scottish constituencies at the 2005 General Election, in 2007 spoilt
ballot papers constituted 2 per cent of the votes for Scottish local councils, and
3.5per centof thevotes cast for theScottishParliamentelections. In their analysis
Mitchell and Carman (2007) established that:
• of 146,097 ballot papers rejected at the Scottish Parliamentary elections,
85,644 concerned constituency contests (4.1 per cent of the total) and 60,455
regional lists (2.9 per cent);
• theproportionof spoilt ballots had risen sixfold for the constituency contests
and fourfold for the regional list contests, compared to theprevious elections
held in 2003;
• the proportion of ballot papers rejected in constituency contests had risen
across all constituencies, but had done so most dramatically in areas with
higher levels of socio-economicdeprivation– in threeGlasgowconstituencies
rejected ballots comprised ten per cent or more of total votes cast.
Summary of theGould Report on the 2007 Scottish Elections
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While the remit of the Gould review was relatively broad, reflecting the range of
problems experienced in the May elections, it was agreed that the review team
wouldnotexplore the issueof thevalidityof thevote.The reviewprocess included
a series of more than 20 meetings with key stakeholders and expert witnesses
held in June and July, consideration of 27 written submissions, analysis of public
consultationconductedby theElectoralCommission, anda reviewof the rejected
ballot papers. The review team’s final report was issued on 23 October 2007 and
raised fundamental concerns about the entire electoral process. In summary,
the review identified seven ‘issues areas’ which, taken together, created an
electoral process in which “the voter was treated as an afterthought”:
• Legislation: UK electoral legislation was found to be “fragmented” and
“antiquated”, with recent “poorly conceived and badly timed” amendments
only serving to compound these problems;
• Roles, relationshipsandaccountability: thesewerealso foundtobe ‘“extremely
fragmented”, to theextent that efforts to ensure smooth runningof elections
were ‘“hindered at almost every stage of the process”;
• Planning and timing: the elections were undermined by a lack of realistic
timetabling and an absence of effective planning, returning officers were too
reliant onexternal suppliers and therewas inadequate contingencyplanning;
• Combined elections: holding local councils and Scottish Parliament elections
simultaneously was arguably cost effective and may have ensured greater
turnout in the local elections but added to voter confusion, constituting “not
only adisservice to the local councils andcandidatesbut also to theelectorate
as well”;
• Ballot papers and voting issues: the design of the ballot papers was the major
causeof thehighnumberof rejectedballotpapers–apossibility thathadbeen
highlighted by the otherwise inadequate ‘user testing research’, but appears
tohavebeenoverlookedby theessentiallypartisandebate surroundingballot
paper design. There was an ‘“over reliance on postal voting”;
• Public information: while many aspects of the public information campaign
designed to explain both the new AMS ballot paper and the introduction of
STVwere seenas commendable, the report also criticised thedelayed roll-out
of the campaign and the failure to ensure that the information reached all
sections of the electorate;
• Thecount: the report criticised thecount forplacing “unreasonabledemands”
onelectionofficials and,while accepting the rationale for electronic counting,
also raisedmultiple concernsabout the failure toensureadequate legal, policy
and administrative procedures were in place to facilitate e-counting,
particularly with regard to contingency planning.
BOX 1.2 continued
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Issues for further investigation
Significant concerns arise from the initial assessment of UK election procedures against inter-
national standards presented in this chapter. The findings of recent electoral observation and
monitoring reports would, in themselves, be grounds enough to advocate an urgent review of
British electoral law and administration. Indeed, the issues raised by theGould report alone have
been a major catalyst behind the Electoral Commission’s decision to engage in a fundamental
review of electoral policy with the aim of “putting electors at the heart of electoral policy and
decision-making” (Electoral Commission, 2007c). However, it is also important to probe deeper
and to examine the extent to which wider evidence supports or refutes the conclusions reached
by the election studies outlined above. A review of the wider evidence base is presented in
chapters two and three, which focus, respectively, on assessing the extent of electoral malprac-
tice and on evaluating the legacies of a decade of electoral modernisation in the UK.
At the same time, it is important to note that the international standards discussed here have
relatively little to say in relation to matters of election finance. To a large extent, this relative
silence on the issue of finance derives from the difficulty of reaching international agreement
about regulating campaign spending across democracies in which very different attitudes pre-
vail towards the role of private and public financing of elections. However, it should be under-
lined that academic literature on elections has long highlighted the fundamental importance of
financial regulations, or the lack of them, to any assessment of the extent to which elections are
free and fair. As Birch (2005, p.6–7) argues, “if there is one way in whichmodern democratic pol-
itics can be said to be manifestly unfair, it is in the financial requirements of standing for office
in many countries and the advantages afforded candidates and parties by campaign spending”.
These concerns form the basis for the discussion of election finance presented in chapter four,
which highlights the crucial connections between the UK’s ‘first-past-the-post’ electoral sys-
tem, elections spending and turnout.
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Electoral law: the essentials
Electoral malpractice can, by definition, only be understoodwith reference to electoral law. It is,
after all, on the basis of legislation, principally the Representation of the People Acts, that elec-
toral offences are defined, investigated and prosecuted. However, even seasoned political
observers are generally unfamiliar with the vicissitudes of UK electoral law. Indeed, while it is
important not to underestimate the importance of the legislative changes introduced in 2000,
it is equally crucial to appreciate the significance of the distinctly Victorian foundations of British
electoral law and administration.
Virtually all of the key principles underpinning British electoral law today are provided by the
Ballot Act of 1872 and theCorrupt PracticesAct of 1854 (as consolidated by theCorrupt and Illegal
Practices Act of 1883). This legislation was introduced as part of broader attempts to eradicate
widespread practices of corruption and malpractice in nineteenth century parliamentary elec-
tions (O’Leary, 1962; Watt, 2006). The Ballot Act introduced the requirement for a secret ballot.
Specifically, the Act required that each elector to receive a single, numbered, paper ballot, to be
provided to them, andmarked by the elector, in designated polling stations, before being placed
in a secure box in the presence of a ‘presiding officer’. The Acts relating to corrupt practices out-
lawed a number of specific electoral practices – including bribery, treating and intimidation – and,
from 1883, placed limits on the election expenditure of candidates. These Acts, as consolidated by
RPA 1949 and 1983, remained the central planks of British electoral law for over 100 years and sig-
nificant sections of them remain accurate descriptions of current electoral law (Watt, 2006).
WhileRPA2000andPPERA2000haveprovided themost significant changes to electoral process-
es in the UK since 1883, particularly because of the establishment of the Electoral Commission,
most of the legal and institutional framework for elections was left largely intact. Despite the
introduction of postal voting on demand, and provision for pilots of electronic voting, the prin-
cipal electoral offences in the UK remain those defined in RPA 1983 – primarily: personation,
undue influence, bribery, treating and multiple voting. As the terminology suggests, the defini-
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“Both academics and politicians have taken the integrity of the
electoral process for granted (…) there is no research on the
extent of fraud and its causes, and without research, difficult
although it would be, it is impossible to be definitive about the
causes. The danger of electoral corruption and fraud is that it is
presently hidden. The Birmingham election court exposed its
presence in one major British city. It is possible it would be found
elsewhere if the same degree of scrutiny were applied.”
Stewart (2006, p.667)
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tion of these offences first appeared in Victorian statues. Likewise while provision wasmade for
‘rolling registration’ in RPA 2000 to augment the traditional annual canvass of households, no
other significant changes weremade to the locally-based system of registration or to the role of
locally-appointed returning officers in overseeing elections. Meanwhile, candidates at general
elections are still required to appoint agents, who are responsible for keeping accounts demon-
strating that campaign expenditure iswithin legally defined limits. Likewise, the principalmeans
of challenging an election result remains the long-established mechanism of the ‘election peti-
tion’. Election petitions must be submitted by a candidate or elector within 21 days of the elec-
tiondate, shouldprovide evidenceof grounds for disputing theoutcomeandmust be accompanied
by a deposit of £2,500 (in the case of a local election) or £5,000 (in the case of a general elec-
tion). All of these arrangements date back to the nineteenth century.
The role of the Electoral Commission,which began itswork inNovember 2000, sits uneasilywith-
in a legal and administrative framework in which fundamental tensions are evident between
distinctly Victorian legal foundations and more recent reforms intended to promote electoral
modernisation. Established by PPERA, the Electoral Commission is an independent body charged
with a multi-faceted remit, including (alongside other responsibilities): reviewing and advising on
electoral law; reviewing and evaluating electoral pilot projects; implementing andmonitoring reg-
ulations concerning party funding and election spending; and promoting public participation in
theelectoral process (Randall, 2005). In theperiodsince2000, theElectoralCommissionhas, there-
fore, established itself as a major presence in debates on electoral processes.
However, the Electoral Commission’s capacity to lead on electoral matters has been questioned
consistently in recent years, and it has appeared to lack the legal authority enjoyed by equiva-
lent organisations overseas. In particular, theCommission has been frequently frustrated by gov-
ernmental reluctance to accept its advice on electoral matters and, as a result, its relationship
to government is arguably “pervaded by uncertainty and ambiguity about the status and author-
ity of theCommission’s advice” (Randall, 2005, p.406). The recent reviewof the role of theElectoral
Commission carried out by the Committee on Standards in Public Life confirmed this interpre-
tation. While recognising that the work of the Electoral Commission holds widespread respect,
the Committee made 47 separate recommendations concerning its future role. These recom-
mendations centred upon the Commission’s remit being “amended and refocused so that it has
two principal statutory duties: as a regulator of political party funding and campaign expendi-
ture in the UK; and as regulator of electoral administration in Great Britain (…)” (Committee on
Standards in Public Life, 2007).
ElectoralMalpractice: a thing of the past?
The changes introduced by RPA 2000 were underpinned by the crucial assumption that corrup-
tion and malpractice had been virtually eradicated from British elections. Long-term trends in
electoral malpractice suggest that this view has apparently strong foundations. Until the 1880s,
bribery and treating were commonplace in British parliamentary elections and elections were
routinely subject to legal challenge via election petitions; a total of 142 election petitions were
upheld on the grounds of corrupt practice in the period 1832 to 1885 (see appendix A). After the
Corrupt and Illegal Practices Act of 1883, there was a dramatic fall in both the number of peti-
tions submitted and the number that were successful (O’Leary, 1962; King, 1990). By 1948, the
Carn Committee on electoral reform was able to report that few election petitions had been
presented since the 1920s. In the period since 1945, just four petitions challenging parliamen-
tary contests have attracted significant attention, none of which concerned corruption or mal-
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practice (concerning contests in Mid-Ulster, 1955; North Kensington, 1960; Bristol South-East,
1961; Winchester, 1997). Indeed, it has widely held that “since 1923 there have been no successful
petitions alleging corrupt practices in parliamentary elections” (Stewart, 2006, p.657). Election
petitions relating to local elections since 1945 are likely to have been more common, although
there is no robust data from which to assess their frequency or the extent to which they raised
concerns about the integrity of elections.
The second clear historical trend inUKelections prior to the 1990swas that the vast bulk of accu-
sations of electoral malpractice originated from Northern Ireland, although systematic – as
opposed to anecdotal – evidence of such practices is hard to identify (Mitchell and Gillespie,
1999, p.71). The most frequently cited form of evidence – the submission of upwards of 900 ten-
dered ballots in the Westminster election of 1983 – provides only a poor proxy measure of the
extent of personation offences.1 Nonetheless, given the widespread accusations of electoral
fraud in Northern Ireland in previous years, it is significant that the number of tendered ballot
papers issued in the province at the 2005 General Election was just 55, constituting one-twenti-
eth of the figure 18 years previously. It is notable that the virtual disappearance of the accusa-
tions that once dogged elections in Northern Ireland has come in the wake of various measures
designed to render the electoral process in the province more secure, including the introduc-
tion of individual registration, themaintenance of restrictions on postal ballots, and the require-
ment for voters to produce ID before obtaining a ballot paper. (The significance of these reforms
is returned to in the conclusion to this report.)
The detailed statistics and wider empirical evidence relating to electoral malpractice in nine-
teenth century Britain are not replicated for the twentieth century. As a result, specific trends
in electoral malpractice in the UK in the period prior to the reforms of 2000 are difficult to dis-
cern. Yet, the absence of evidence should not be taken as an indicator of the absence of suchmal-
practice. As Stewart (2006) notes, the lack of research conducted on the topic pre-2000 reflected
awidely held assumption that electoral fraudwas absolutely negligible. There are, however, some
grounds to dispute the validity of this conventional wisdom. In his pioneering account of cor-
ruption and misconduct in British politics, Alan Doig (1984, p.205) cites two cases of successful
prosecutions against electoral agents for corrupt practices in 1974 and 1979. Peter Kilfoyle’s (2000)
account of local Labour Party politics in Liverpool in the 1980s alludes to numerous incidents of
potential malpractice, principally in relation toMilitant supporters ‘packing the register’ in spe-
cific wards in order to influence candidate selection. More recently, Home Office records show
that between 1994 and 1999 a total of 32 people were found guilty of offences under the
Representation of the People Act 1983 (Hansard, 19 Apr 2004, Column 94W).
Supplementary information about these convictions for electoral offences in the 1990s, gleaned
fromparliamentary records andmedia reports, suggest that the offences typically involved fraud-
ulent applications for proxy votes, with prosecution brought in places as diverse as Chorley,
Sheffield, West Lancashire, St Ives, Enfield, Brighton and Cynon Valley (Guardian, 9 May 2001;
Select Committee on Home Affairs – 4th Report, October 1998; Independent, 3rd May 1995;
Hansard, 21May 1997: Column 676). During the 1990s, widespread accusations of fraudulent use
of proxy voting procedures were also made in Burnley, although no prosecutions were brought
at that time.However, localmedia reports on accusations of electoralmalpractice in Burnley dur-
ing the 1990s underline howmuchwas known at the time about the likely fraudulent use of proxy
votes, not just locally, but also by the national Labour Party and the Home Office (see box 2.1).
1 A tendered ballot may be requested by a registered elector who, upon providing their name and address at a polling station, is
informed that they have already beenmarked on the register as having voted. Tendered ballots are printed on a different colour paper
and are not included in the count unless there is a successful legal challenge to the election result.
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Followingthe localelectionsof 1994 inBurnley, anelectionpetitionwassubmitted,
challenging the result of the local elections in the Daneshouse ward, by the
defeatedLabour candidateand long-standing local councillor, RafiqueMalik. The
petition alleged that the winning candidate, Liberal Democrat Fazal Subhan,
hadbenefited fromfraudulentproxyvotes in securinganarrowthreevotevictory
in thecontest.While thepetitionwasallowed, resulting inanelectioncourtbeing
scheduled, permission was subsequently given for the petition to be withdrawn,
amid concerns about the potential cost of the hearing, which had been predicted
to reach £250,000.
In April 1996, fresh allegations of abuse of proxy voting provisions emerged, this
timedirectedagainstRafiqueMalik. Followingcomplaints fromLiberalDemocrat
representatives, it was established by council officials that two applications for
proxyvotes submittedby the local LabourParty related tovotersactually resident
in Oldham. In the wake of the discovery, it was reported that Audrey Hannah, a
member of the Burnley Labour Party, had written to Labour Head Office urging
that, “If there is apossibilityofpartymembersbeing involved inpotential election
fraud then it should be investigated by the party”.
However, despite investigations carried out by Lancashire Police, applications
for proxy votes continued to increase, and accusations of fraud continued to
surroundwardelections inDaneshouse.From1994to 1996,proxyvoteapplications
inDaneshousewere reported tohave risen from200 to 300.However, by the late
1990s, applications for proxy votes had exceeded 1,300, equivalent to 28 per
cent of registered electors in the ward. The May 1999 elections in Daneshouse,
contested between Mozaquir Ali for the Liberal Democrats and Saeed Akhtar
Chaudhary for Labour, were dogged by allegations of fraud from both sides,
with some 1,150 proxy votes submitted.
Burnley Borough Council and Lancashire Police have sought to respond to these
allegations in a number of ways. Evidence regarding the abnormally high levels
of proxy vote applications was referred to both George Howarth, MP, in his role
asChairof theHomeOfficeWorkingGrouponElectoralReform,andMikeO’Brien,
the Home Office Minister with responsibility for electoral matters. The case
was also reported to Lancashire Police, resulting in a nine-month investigation,
subsequently referred to the Crown Prosecution Service in January 2000. While
no furtheractionwas taken in relation to the 1999allegations, allegationsof fraud
associatedwithproxyandpostal votes continued,mostnotably at the2004 local
elections, culminating in the conviction of Mozaquir Ali, and fellow councillor
Manzur Hussain, in November 2006.
Sources: Lancashire Evening Telegraph: 4 April 1996, 16 April 1996, 11 December 1996,
31 May 1999, 24 January 2000 and 16 February 2007.
Allegations of electoral fraud in Burnley during the 1990s
BOX 2.1
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Howmuch electoral malpractice is there today?
Given the lack of research, it is very difficult to estimate current levels of electoral malpractice.
There are no robust quantitative indicators of electoral fraud and malpractice, since no central
body collects such information (Electoral Commission, 2007a, p.1). There are three sources of
data currently available, however, which may provide some degree of indication of the number
of proven instances of malpractice. These three sources, and the evidence that may be drawn
from them, may be summarised as follows:
1. Crown Prosecution Service files: The Electoral Commission’s (2007a) analysis of rel-
evant files held by Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) suggested that a total of 402 alle-
gations of electoral offences (as defined by the Representation of the People Act,
1983) were made during the period 2000 to 2006. A total of 72 per cent of these alle-
gations concerned aspects of electoral campaigning (principally, electoral expenses
and election materials), while 23 per cent concerned alleged voting offences (such as
personation, treating and undue influence). A further five per cent concerned aspects
of electoral registrationor electoral administration. Subsequent analysis by the Electoral
Commission (2007b) revised the previous estimate of 402 cases, and instead referred
to 383 ‘entries’ on the CPS files. From these ‘entries’, the Electoral Commission (2007b)
have identified 24 successful prosecutions for electoral offences under RPA from2000–
06 (see appendix C for further detail and analysis).
2. Official statistics on RPA offences: Home Office data cited in Hansard (28 October
2005, Column646W) provides broad confirmation of the number of prosecutions iden-
tified from the CPS files. These data suggest that, from 2000 to 2004, twelve persons
were found guilty of electoral offences under the 1983 Representation of the People
Act, representing a slight fall in the frequency of convictions compared to 1994–99 (see
table B1 in appendix B for full details).
3. Official statistics on electoral petitions:Data on election petitions cited in Hansard
indicate that 50 electionpetitionswere submitted from 1997 to 2007 inclusive (Hansard,
22Mar 2007: Column 1105W and 1106W). There has been no rise in the number of peti-
tions since 2000, and the vast bulk of petitions (84 per cent) concern local elections
(see table B2 in appendix B). Only one of the eight petitions relating to general or
European elections was subsequently allowed and upheld (although this was subse-
quently reversed on appeal). Of the cases concerning local elections, one third dealt
with straightforward claims of votes being incorrectly counted in very tight contests.
From the 20 caseswhere a resultwas overturnedby thepetition, 17 concerned the incor-
rect counting of votes or some form of administrative error that was deemed to have
impacted upon the outcome.
It is important to note that both the CPS files and theHomeOffice data cited above refer specif-
ically to cases tried under the Representation of the People Act (1983). However, there is a grow-
ing trend for convictions for electoral fraud to be brought under alternative legislation. In 2005,
theHomeOfficewas ‘aware’ of four persons having been foundguilty of electoral offences under
criminal law provisions against forgery and fraud during the period 2000 to 2004 (Hansard, 28
October 2005, Column 646W). Comparison of the published analysis of the CPS files against
information collated from a range of legal, academic andmedia sources suggests a slight major-
ity of cases are now tried under legislation other than the Representation of the People Act 1983.
In total, therewere aminimumof twelve further convictions for electoral offences from 1 January
2005 to 31 October 2007. Excluding the three cases currently in the courts, we can infer from the
available evidence that there have been at least 42 convictions for electoral offences since
2000. In otherwords, the actual number of prosecutions for electoral offences since 2000 is like-
ly to be at least double that recorded in official statistics.
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What do these statistics actually tell us, other than the fact that current knowledge about levels
of electoral fraud in the UK is seriously inadequate? There are three ways in which we might
seek to interpret this data on electoral offences since 2000. The first interpretation, put forward
by the Electoral Commission, is that proven cases of fraud and malpractice relate to a tiny pro-
portion of the elections held since 2000. As the Electoral Commission points out in its analysis
of the CPS files, the 402 allegations of electoral offences between 2000 and 2006 arose from
25,000 separate electoral contests in England andWales, involving 109,500 candidates and 123.5
million ballot papers. Where there is no benchmark to establish an ‘acceptable level’ of fraud, it
is clear that individuals convicted for electoral offences constitute no more than 0.1 per cent of
candidates standing for office (derived from Electoral Commission, 2007a). A second, counter-
interpretation, however,would be that the number of convictions reflects the difficulties of secur-
ing sufficient evidence to prosecute. As a result, several senior police officers have suggested
that figures on current convictions clearly under-estimate the incidence ofmalpractice (Thames
Valley Police, 2005; Metropolitan Police Authority, 2006). The thirdway of interpreting the avail-
able evidence is to focus not on the number of cases, but onwhat is revealed, in amore qualitative
sense, by theeventsdocumented in thesecases. Inparticular, the interpretationof the issues raised
by the Birmingham election court of 2004 (see box 2.2) advanced by legal scholars and academics
has been unanimous in arguing that it reveals significant, generic, weaknesses in the electoral sys-
tem that have made it significantly more vulnerable to organised, large-scale fraud (Watt, 2006).
The outcome of the local elections held in the Aston and Bordersley Green
wards of Birmingham City Council on 10 June 2004 were both challenged via
electionpetitions.Thesepetitionswereheardsimultaneouslybetween21February
and 22 March 2005, by Richard Mawrey QC and resulted in both election results
being voided. In his judgment, the commissioner found that at least 3,500 postal
ballots submitted in the Bordersley Green and Aston wards were fraudulent.
Mawrey reported that “the evidence of fraud was overwhelming”. Alongside a
number of other irregularities, a large quantity of ballot papers relating to the
Aston ward were found to have been taken to a warehouse, where they were
completed by Labour Party representatives. A total of six Labour Party
representativeswere found tohavebeenengaged in corrupt and illegal practices
in the two wards, as defined by section 164 of RPA 1983. However, one of the six
respondents, Muhammed Afzal, was subsequently cleared of any wrongdoing
by the Court of Appeal in May 2005.
Despite being relatively recent, the Birmingham petitions have been the subject
of greater academicand legal commentary thananycaseof electoralmalpractice
in theUKsince 1900.Theattention is clearlymerited.The scaleof fraud identified
by the cases was without precedent in recent British political history, profound
implications were raised regarding the security of postal voting, and significant
concerns were raised about the capacity of the police to investigate allegations
of electoral fraud. At the same time, the unambiguous wording of the judgment
also ensured that the case received widespread media attention. Most famously,
Mawrey argued that the case represented electoral fraud on a scale “that would
The Birmingham Election Petitions, 2004
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disgraceabanana republic”.However, the commissioner’s judgmentwasequally
direct in identifying numerous, generic weaknesses in postal voting provisions
and in the wider arrangements for investigating allegations of fraud. Among the
many concerns identified by Mawrey, the following may be considered the most
significant:
1. Procedures for registering voters for postal ballots were ‘seriously defective’
on grounds of the deadline six days before polling day being insufficient, the
lackofguarantee that theapplicationhadbeenmadeby thevoter inquestion,
and the provision allowing the ballot to be sent to an address different to
that of the registered elector.
2. Declarations of Identity provided no safeguard against fraud since there was
nomeansofverifyingeither signaturesor thenameandaddressof thewitness.
3. Allowing ballot papers to be dispatched and returned via the postal system,
and the lack of any legislation preventing the handling of completed ballots
by thirdparties,were seenasadirect invitation to fraudsters: “Shortofwriting
‘STEAL ME’ on the envelopes, it is hard to see what more could be done to
ensure their coming into the wrong hands”.
4. Therewasnomeansofeffectivelydetectingorpreventing fraudsinceReturning
Officers have no powers to investigating fraud and the Police with limited
knowledge of electoral law had effectively been hoodwinked into initially
ignoring malpractice: “The Police attitude was well summed up by the use of
the codename for these complaints – Operation Gripe. In essence, the police
did nothing to prevent the frauds which occurred”.
5. The mechanism of the election petition was seen to be “both inadequate and
inappropriate as a method of controlling fraud” given its status as a private
civil law action in which the litigant must bear the costs.
6. The Government’s insistence that robust safeguards were in place to prevent
postal ballot fraud represented a state of denial: “The fact is that there are no
systems to deal realistically with fraud and there never have been. Until
there are, fraud will continue unabated”.
There canbe little doubt that theevidencearising fromtheBirminghamcasewas
theprincipal catalystboth for thechanges topostal votingprocedures introduced
in the Electoral Administration Act of 2006 and to the development of a much
stronger capacity to respond to electoral fraud allegations within police forces.
However, many of the fundamental concerns expressed in Mawrey’s judgment
have not yet been addressed and, following the May 2006 local elections in
Birmingham, a further election petition was submitted making fresh allegations
ofcorruptand illegalpractices in theAstonwardagainstMuhammedAfzal. Further
evidence, unrelated to the 2006 election petition, arising from a BBC Newsnight
investigation, concerning accusation of voters being paid cash for ballot papers
and for impersonatingothervoterswasbroadcaston31October2007.Responding
to the report, Sir Alistair Graham, former Chair of the Committee on Standards
in Public Life stated: “It beggars belief really that such serious allegations have
cometo light threeyearsafter the Judge talkedaboutactions that ‘woulddisgrace
a Banana republic’”.
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Thepolitical and social geographyof electoralmalpractice
The details of the convictions for electoral offences that have been identified through the research
undertaken for this report are summarised in Appendix C. There would not appear to be any spe-
cific patterns to these convictions; they are not restricted to a single political party, to specific geo-
graphical areas or to particular migrant communities. Taking into account what is known about
electoral misconduct since the 1990s, it is important to stress that representatives of at least six
political parties have been convicted of electoral offences over the past 15 years, including Labour,
the Conservatives, the Liberal Democrats, Plaid Cymru, the Democratic Unionist Party, and the
British National Party. The convictions concern incidents spread across five English regions, plus
Wales and Northern Ireland, although it is also apparent that the vast bulk of cases concern elec-
tions inEngland.While anumberofhigh-profile cases, including twocasesof large-scale fraud,have
concerned local councillors representing areas with a high proportion of British Asian voters, the
majority of individuals convicted of electoral offences remain white males.
However, there is no denying that numerous convictions for electoral fraud since 2000 have con-
cerned postal and proxy ballot fraud in specific inner-urban wards, where a large concentration of
voters originate from the Indian sub-continent. The convictions successfully brought in relation to
local elections inOldham(2000),Blackburn (2002),Burnley (2004)andBirmingham(2004)all con-
cerned BritishMuslim communities and collectively account for 50 per cent of the convictions for
electoral offences containedon theCPS files (seeappendixC). Significantly, theseconvictionshave
emergedalongsideanecdotal evidenceofmorewidespread, and long-run,practicesassociatedwith
Pakistani, Kashmeri and Bangladeshi traditions of Biraderi (‘brotherhood’) clans in influencing vot-
ing behaviour.
The Biraderi system is widely recognised to have provided significant forms of mutual support in
those British Asian communities in which it has persisted, particularly for newly arrived migrants
joining established communities in the UK (Gilchrist, 2004). However, the hierarchical and essen-
tially patriarchal nature of Biraderi associations has drawnmuch criticism, particularly among sec-
ond and third generation British Asians (Yaqoob, 2007a). Claims of specific forms of electoral
malpracticeassociatedwithBiraderi arealso relatively commonplace inanumberof areas, although
there has been no systematic research on these issues (Purdham, 2001). In particular, it is widely
suggested that extended family and kinship networks, frequently with their origins in settlement
patterns in Pakistan and Bangladesh, aremobilised to secure the support of up to several hundred
electors, effectivelyconstitutinga ‘blockvote’. Inareassuchas theLondonBoroughofTowerHamlets,
such practices are frequently referred to as ‘village politics’, in light of the direct lines of connec-
tion between aspects of local party politics and tribal elders in Bangladesh. Reference to suchprac-
tices was recently made in a report to the Metropolitan Police Authority by the Assistant
Commissioner for Specialist Operations of theMetropolitan Police:
“Anecdotally, some community contacts have remarked on how such practices that are seen as
acceptable outside the UK have been adopted in respect of UK elections – for example, the
head of an extended family instructing family members to vote for a particular party or can-
didate. Postal voting increases the risk, as the safeguard of a truly secret ballot is removed.”
(Metropolitan Police Authority, 2006, p.3)
The possible influence of Biraderi on electoral practices raises a number of complex issues, all of
which would require detailed, and difficult, research.Without such research, almost all of the con-
clusions thatmaybe reachedare speculativeand largelybasedonanecdotal evidence.Nonetheless,
existing knowledge, in combination with available anecdotal evidence, does provide a fairly clear
indication of identified patterns of electoral practice in some British Asian communities. While
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British Muslims overwhelmingly voted Labour prior to 2003 (Purdham, 2001), the war in Iraq fun-
damentally altered this relationship (Stewart, 2006).Aspartof thishighly specific instanceof ‘voter
de-alignment’, there is largelyanecdotal evidence tosuggest that identificationwithparticularpolit-
ical parties tends to bemuchmore fluid amongmanyBritishAsian voters, activists and evenpoliti-
cians. In this context, it is evident that each of the principal political parties have at some stage
sought to acquire a degree of political advantage in particular localities through the promise of a
Muslim candidate claiming to be able to ‘guarantee’ aminimumnumber of votes arising from their
support with a wider clan. In a BBC Radio 4 documentary on Biraderi broadcast in August 2003,
ShaidMalik, since returned as LabourMP for Dewsbury, suggested that such practice had become
commonplace: “Labour and other parties got used to dealing with clan people and there seems to
be an unwitting collusion there between the parties and first generation British Pakistanis” (BBC
News, 2003).
As a result, accusations of electoral malpractice associated with British Muslim candidates have
been made against candidates from all three main parties. Speaking in the House of Commons in
July 2007, Anne Cryer, LabourMP for Keighley, accused aMuslim Conservative Party candidate of
using “the tactics of intimidation, treating and discriminatory propaganda to secure electoral vic-
tory in Keighley Central ward” (Hansard, 26 July 2007: Column 1126) adding: “I do not believe that
the type of incidents witnessed in Keighley on 3 May are confined to Keighley. Similar allegations
have arisen across the country.” (Hansard, 26 July 2007: Column 1127). In some instances, the dra-
matic electoral success that may be achieved by parties aligning themselves with the Biraderi sys-
tem has subsequently caused internal party conflicts. This tendency has been most apparent in
TowerHamlets,whereGeorgeGallowaywaselectedtorepresentBethnalGreenandBowforRespect
in 2005 andwhere 12Respect councillorswere elected in 2006. InOctober2007, fourRespect coun-
cillors in Tower Hamlets resigned the party whip, with one councillor explaining her decision with
guarded reference to her frustrations at the reassertion of Biraderi associations within the party:
“I justhadenough. Ihaven'tresignedfromthepartybutthewaythingsareturningout inTowerHamlets
are not the reasons I joined Respect. It’s become very village politics based” (BBC London, 2007).
In addition, it has beenwidely suggested that theBiraderi systemdisenfranchises voters, given the
combinationofapatriarchal clan systemandwidespreaduseofpostal voting, inwhichballotpapers
are completed within the family home or, in some cases, taken to a central facility (so called ‘vot-
ing factories’) for completion by party representatives. The Metropolitan Police have suggested
that in communities where English is a second language the complexity of postal voting forms has
made it easier for those seeking tomanipulate theelectoral process. Inparticular, theMetropolitan
Policehave suggested that there is evidence “within theBengali community inTowerHamlets” that
electors have been persuaded to re-direct their postal ballots to another address or to hand them
over toparty representatives (MetropolitanPoliceAuthority, 2006). Similar conclusionswere reached
by an under-cover investigation by The Sunday Times of Labour Party practices in the Gipton and
Harehills ward of Leeds (The Sunday Times, 27 April, 2007). Aside from representing a likely breach
ofelectoral law, thewidely acceptedexistenceof suchpracticeshighlightedaclearparadox regard-
ing postal voting: “Although intended to encourage active citizenship on the part of immigrant and
socially disadvantaged groups, it may have had the opposite effect” (Pinto-Duschinsky, 2007). The
danger that many Muslim women are being disenfranchised is particularly serious and has been
elaborated in detail by Salma Yaqoob, Respect councillor in Birmingham:
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“It is for the reasons that biraderi (extended clan) networks can exert undue influence that we
have been campaigning vigorously in Birmingham against postal votes. Women in particular
have been disenfranchised. Postal votes are filled out in the ‘privacy’ of one’s own home. But it
is not private when family members, candidates or supporters, can influence subtly or other-
wise – the way you complete your vote. Community leaders may claim to be able to yield sig-
nificant voter blocs, but no one can interfere with the secrecy of the polling station. A secret
ballotmeans that loyalties to family and friends can bemaintained in public, but political argu-
ments can still win out in the real privacy of the voting booth.” (Yaqoob, 2007b. pp.3–4)
Summingup the evidence
Many of the conclusions that can be drawn from the available evidence on electoral malpractice
are necessarily tentative. However, there are at least four important conclusions that we may
draw, even from such an inadequate evidence base.
1. Whilst electoral fraud isbynomeanswidespreadand,basedontheavailabledata, itwould
appear that the number of convictions for electoral offences has not increased signifi-
cantly following reforms introduced in 2000, electoral fraud does occur in the UK. The
documented existence of electoralmalpractice during the 1990s serves to underline that
the scope for large-scale fraud associated with postal voting could, and should, have
been predicted, resulting in appropriate safeguards being built into the legislation.
2. Official statistics underestimate the extent of electoral malpractice because a growing
number of prosecutions are being brought with reference to legislation other than RPA
1983. This trend not only underlines the inadequacy of the statistical data, but also of the
manner inwhich electoral offences are defined in the Representation of the People Acts.
3. There are a small number of localities in which electoral malpractice appears to bemore
deeply embedded, with some evidence to suggest that these concentrations arise from
the interaction between traditional Biraderi practices within British Asian communities
and the strategies adopted by the main political parties. However, the clearest trend in
patterns of electoral malpractice over the past two decades is that what was once seen
as a specifically Northern Irish problem has since become a specifically English one.
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Postal voting and the assessment of risk
The chief assumption underpinning electoral modernisation has been the government’s view
that remote voting inUKelections, initially throughpostal ballots and ultimately via ‘multi-chan-
nel’ elections, will serve to reverse the recent decline in electoral participation. However, while
the rationale for the introduction of postal voting on demand in 2000 was clear, it is important
to note that there had been a number of reviews of provisions for remote and absentee voting
prior to the Howarth Working Group of 1998/99. These reviews had been dominated by a con-
cern to ensure the security of the ballot and the integrity of electoral procedures, rather than by
a concern to promote electoral participation (Randall, 2005).
It is significant, given the evidence discussed in the previous chapter, that the limited extension
of postal and proxy voting during the 1980s (see box 3.1) had already prompted concerns by the
early 1990s about the possibility of greater levels of fraud, particularly in light of the cases of
proxy vote abuse highlighted in chapter two. While the absolute number of cases of fraud asso-
ciated with proxy voting was relatively small, a Home Office Working Party in 1994 considered
that instances of electoral fraud underlined the need for caution in extending the availability of
proxy or postal voting:
“A move to absent voting on demand might increase the opportunity for fraudulent applica-
tions to be made without the knowledge of the elector. On balance, we consider that the risk
of increased fraud outweighs the potential advantage for the electorate of making absent vot-
ing available to all.” (Home Office Working Party, 1994, cited in Guardian, 9 May 2001)
ChapterThree:
The lessons and the legacies of
electoralmodernisation
“Corruption is (…) probable if elections are introduced in a
situation in which society is organised hierarchically on the basis
of some kind of ‘feudal’ leadership, or in groups (…) which cohere
strongly for reasons which have nothing to do with national
politics. The antidotes to corruption are strong and independent
party organisations (…) and good electoral administration.”
MacKenzie (1958 p.171)
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The decision to extend postal votingwas therefore amajor departure, offering an interpretation
of the risk of electoral malpractice starkly at odds with the conclusions of the 1994 review. The
sixty eight page final report of theWorking Party on Electoral Procedures contained a single ref-
erence to electoral fraud, simply stating that the group had been careful “to look critically at the
possible implications for electoral fraud. Overall we are satisfied that none of the recommen-
dations we set out below will lead to any significantly higher risk of abuse”(Home Office, 1999,
p.48). Based on this confidence, which reflected cross-party consensus among members of the
Working Party, the report recommended that postal votes should be permitted ‘on demand’ and
a simplified procedure for applying for postal ballots be introduced. These recommendations, as
implemented by RPA 2000, have allowed any registered voter to request a postal ballot at every
UK election since 16 February 2001 (White et al., 2005).
Representation of the PeopleActs 1918 and 1945
Both Acts made temporary provision for members of the armed services serving
abroad to vote by post. The 1918 Act made permanent provision for members of
the armed services to vote by proxy if overseas at the time of an election.
Representation of the PeopleAct 1948
Granted serving members of the armed forces the permanent right to vote by
post (within theUK)orbyproxy if servingoverseas/at sea at the timeof election.
Introduced provisions for postal and proxy voting for civilians unable to attend
a polling station on grounds of health, disability or old age.
Representation of the PeopleAct 1985
Enabled British citizens living overseas to apply to vote by proxy in the
constituency inwhich they last lived, for a period of up to five years after leaving
the UK. These provisions were estimated to have enfranchised an additional
0.5million voters. The 1985 Act also enabled electors onholidayoverseas orwith
other good reasons for beingunable to attendapolling station to apply for either
a proxy or postal ballot.
Representation of the PeopleAct 1989
Extended the provisions for overseas voters, allowing them to cast ballots for up
to 20 years after leaving the UK and permitting British citizens reaching voting
age while living overseas to apply for proxy votes.
Representation of the PeopleAct 2000
Introduced ‘postal voting on demand’, meaning that registered voters were no
longer required to provide reasons for requesting a postal ballot.
Sources: White and Moulton, 2007; Watt, 2006.
Legislation enabling absentee and remote voting, 1918–2000
BOX 3.1
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Sources: The Independent Commission on Alternative Voting Methods (2002, p.19);
Yonwin (2004); The Electoral Commission (2005).
Does postal voting increase turnout?
The growth of postal voting enabled by the new provisions has been dramatic. As figure 3.1
above shows, postal ballots typically comprised two to three per cent of the votes cast at gen-
eral elections between 1974 and 1997. Prompted by the sharp decline in turnout after 1997, the
introduction of postal voting on demand has seen the proportion of ballots cast by post rise to
five per cent in 2001 and 15 per cent in 2005. Soon after the passage of RPA 2000, further pres-
sures to roll out postal voting emerged. Among its proponents, the case for postal voting was
reinforced by the 59 per cent turnout in the 2001 General Election, representing the lowest level
of electoral participation since 1918 (Randall, 2005). While turnout did not rise significantly in
2005, despite the sharp increase in the take-up of postal voting, some of those interviewed in
the course of this research suggested that it is possible that postal voting on demand prevent-
ed turnout falling for a third general election in a row.
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Figure 3.1: Percentage of vote cast by post and overall turnout at
UK general elections, 1974–2005
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Table 3.1: Change in turnout in Parliamentary constituencies with one-third or more
of valid votes cast by post, 2005 General Election
Rank Constituency % postalballots 2005
% increase in
postal votes
2001–2005
% change in
turnout
2001–2005
1. Newcastle upon Tyne North 56.0 +154.9 +8.5
2 Stevenage 53.5 +17.4 +2.8
3 South Shields 47.0 +1130.2 +3.2
4 Newcastle upon Tyne Central 46.8 +165.9 +11.5
5 Rushcliffe 46.5 +918.9 +6.0
6 Newcastle East andWallsend 46.0 +131.6 +4.5
7 Tyne Bridge 42.9 +199.6 -14.0
8 Jarrow 42.3 +1136.3 +0.7
9 Telford 39.8 +949.6 +11.0
10 Hackney South and Shoreditch 37.1 +2983.2 +0.2
11 TheWrekin 36.9 +532.6 +6.2
12 Hackney North and Stoke Newington 35.3 +2014.9 +7.4
13 Rotherham 34.5 +355.3 +23.8
14 Blackpool South 33.3 +544.3 +0.2
15 Don Valley 33.0 +719.5 -0.5
UK AVERAGE 15.0 +183.0 +3.2
However, it is also clear that there have been enormous geographical variations in the take-up
of postal voting, as well as in its impact on turnout. At the 2005 General Election, there were 38
constituencies where at least 25 per cent of votes were cast by post, including 15 where postal
ballots comprised 33 per cent or more. As table 3.1 shows, among the 15 constituencies in which
postal votingwasmost popular in 2005, the change in turnout varied between an increase of 23.8
per cent in Rotherham to a decrease of 14.0 per cent in Tyne Bridge. Moreover, in seven cases –
highlighted in italics – the percentage increase in turnout was either at or below the national
average,with turnout either falling or remaining essentially static in five cases – Jarrow,Hackney
South and Shoreditch, Tyne Bridge and Don Valley – despite the widespread take-up of postal
ballots in these constituencies. Reflecting on the relationship between the uptake of postal bal-
lots and turnout across all constituencies in 2005, Curtice (2005, p.784) concludes that “thewider
availability of postal voting had, at most, a small impact on turnout” adding that:
“Lacking any stimulus to vote, many again stayed at home. Not even the prospect of being able
to avoid the journey to the polling station enticedmany voters to exercise their franchise. Turnout
depends not on giving people a choice about how to vote but rather on what they are voting
about.” (Curtice, 2005, p.784)
Source: Derived from the Electoral Commission (2005)
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Similar issues arise from the evidence relating to the all-postal ballots piloted in local council
elections after 2000. All-postal ballots pointed to strong initial evidence of postal voting raising
turnout at the local elections held from2000–2004, as summarised in Tables 3.2 and 3.3.However,
while the introduction of postal voting did have an immediate, beneficial impact on turnout, it
would also appear that the ‘turnout premium’ is likely to level off, and then decline, at subse-
quent elections. As table 3.3 shows, in areas where all-postal voting has been used on multiple
occasions, turnout tends to plateau and thendrop. There is alsoevidence to suggest thatUKexpe-
rience reflects awidely observed international tendency for postal voting toprovide choice tomid-
dle-class voterswhowouldprobablyhavevotedanyway (KarpandBanducci, 2000;Qvortup, 2005).
Table 3.2: Number of local electoral pilots and assessment of the impact
of all-postal voting pilots, 2000–2004
Year of
elections
No. of
authorities
running pilots
No. of
authorities
running all-
postal pilots
Key conclusions from evaluation reports
2000 32 6 Significant potential for increasing turnoutdemonstrated by all-postal ballots only (LGA, 2000)
2002 30 15
Postal voting pilots showed clearest, positive
impact on turnout (The Electoral Commission,
2002)
2003 59 33 Clear evidence of postal ballots boosting turnout(The Electoral Commission, 2003)
2004 127 127
Turnout up in all regions, but additional increase
of around 5 percentage points in all-postal areas
(The Electoral Commission, 2004)
Table 3.3: Turnout in local elections in areas with three or
more all-postal pilots, 2000–2004
1998 1999 2000 2002 2003 2004
Gateshead 29.3 26.0 56.1* 57.3 54.7 47.7
Stevenage 25.5 29.9 43.6* 52.9 53.2 n.a.
Trafford 33.7 32.8 n.a. 49.0 52.4 45.0
The problems of electoral administration
While the impact of postal voting on turnout is questionable, its implications for electoral admin-
istration have been clear, particularly since 2004. Legislationmaking provision for all-postal bal-
lots was delayed by challenges in the Lords during early 2004, due to growing concerns about
the risk of fraud. As a result, the European Parliamentary and Local Elections (Pilots) Act 2004
finally received Royal Assent on 1 April 2004, just ten weeks before the date of the elections (10
June) (White and Moulton, 2007). While the all-postal pilots of 2004 did result in a number of
allegations of fraud, they were also dogged by media reports suggesting serious administrative
problems. However, despite widespread predictions of results being challenged in the courts,
only five election petitions were submitted with reference to the 2004 elections. Of these five
petitions, three were upheld and resulted in elections being declared void, all relating to local
Notes: *average turnout in two wards piloting all-postal arrangements.
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elections. The first two of the three successful petitions, considered simultaneously by a single
election court, concerned the Aston and Bordersley Green wards of Birmingham City Council,
which receivedwidespreadmedia, academic and legal attention (see chapter two). However, the
third voided election, which received very little publicity, was arguably more representative of
the problems experienced in the all-postal pilots of 2004. This case, concerning the incorrect
delivery of ballot papers for an election to the Derringham ward of Hull City Council reveals a
great deal about the pressures placed on electoral administration by electoral modernisation
(see box 3.2).
At the 2004 local elections, John Carnforth, the UKIP candidate, was declared
thevictorious candidate in theDerringhamwardofHull CityCouncil by amargin
of seven votes, following six recounts. The defeated, second-place candidate,
John Considine, the sitting Independent Councillor (who had first been elected
to Hull City Council as a Labour Councillor in 1983), challenged the result via an
electionpetition.Considineallegedelectoral irregularitiesonthepartof returning
officer, Jan Didrichsen, on a scale that could plausibly have affected the outcome
of theelection.Thealleged irregularitieswere thatnumerousvoters inDerringham
had been sent ballot papers for the Marfleet ward, on the other side of the city,
and that several registered electors in Derringham had received no ballot papers
at all. In linewithelectoral law,Considinewas required to raiseadeposit of £2,500
in order for the case to be heard and was personally liable for any costs incurred
should the election court rule against him.
The election court commenced at the High Court in London on 6 October 2004,
reachingaverdicton24November2004.Thecourt voided theelection, accepting
that an unknown number of voters had received the incorrect ballot papers, as a
result of ballot papers for Marfleet being inserted into envelopes addressed to
electors in Derringham. While Hull City Council had made provisions for voters
to obtain fresh ballot papers once the problem had come to light, the judge
ruled that theseactionsprovided insufficientgrounds toallowthe result to stand.
At the same time, the court also absolved Hull City Council’s returning officer
and elections staff for responsibility, identifying the errors as having been made
at the printers. Nonetheless, the court ruled that the returning officer, as the
respondent to the petition, was liable for the costs incurred by both Considine
and Carnforth. Furthermore, the court ordered that the election be re-run, as a
by-election, within 35 working days, but offered no indication about who should
bear responsibility for the costs incurred in re-running the elections (BBC News,
4 January 2005).
Fresh elections in the Derringham ward duly took place on 13 January 2005, with
Michael Rouse-Deane winning the seat for the Liberal Democrats with a majority
of 248 over John Considine. In October 2006, Rouse-Deane subsequently left the
LiberalDemocratstoservetheremainderofhis termasanIndependent.Meanwhile,
a legal dispute between Hull City Council and the printing company concerned
regarding the costs of the by-election was ongoing as of November 2007.
The City of Hull Election Petition, 2004
BOX 3.2
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In the period since 2004, evidence of growing pressures being placedon theUK’s highly localised
arrangements for electoral administration by persistent legislative change has mushroomed.
While local experience varies, there is also widespread evidence that electoral administration
has long had to operate as a ‘Cinderella service’ within many local authorities, suffering from
poor levels of resourcing and lack of dedicated personnel. The introduction of postal voting on
demand and the imposition of all-postal pilots revealed significant questions about the capaci-
ty of electoral administration to respond to the new legislative requirements. The tendency for
new regulations for postal voting to be introduced via very short timescales has posed particu-
lar challenges over the past five to seven years. These problems have, in turn, been exacerbated
by even more serious concerns about the capacity of the printing industry to deliver large num-
bers of postal ballots, both at short notice and to the specifications required. A number of local
authorities experienced significant problems ensuring that ballot papers were printed on time
and that ballot papers were correctly printed and inserted into the correct envelopes. To cite
one example, in Stockport, calls weremade from opposition councillors for the returning officer
to resign in advance of the 2004 all-postal ballots, after over 200,000 ballot papers by an alter-
native contractor had to be re-printed at short-notice due to serious errors made by the original
printers (Stockport Express, 2 June 2004).
Thesepressures have evidently taken their toll on electoral administration as a profession. Indeed,
it is almost certainly not an exaggeration to suggest that in many parts of the country, systems
of electoral administration may be close to breaking point. One of the most concerning of the
multitude of documents produced about election processes in recent years is the report of the
Association of Electoral Administrators (AEA) on a survey of itsmembers following theMay 2007
elections. These elections were the first ones held following the introduction of procedures for
collecting andcheckingpersonal identifiers for postal ballots aspart of theElectoralAdministration
Act 2006. While supporting these measures, AEA had raised numerous concerns about specific
aspects of the proposals, including the tight timescale for implementation, the serious resource
implications raised, the lack of robust piloting, and the use of previously untested IT systems.
The AEA’s report argues that “the fears that were expressed (…) came to fruition” and provides
detailed, anonymised reports from electoral administrators describing “actual and serious situ-
ations” (Associationof Electoral Administrators, 2007, p.7). The report finds that a series of poten-
tiallymajor problemswere only narrowly averted and raises serious concerns about thepossibility
of such problems being repeated at a general election:
“The outcome of theMay 2007 elections was, to the uninitiated, that they were conducted sat-
isfactorily. Eligible voters were able to vote, candidates did get elected. However the real issue
lies behind those outcomes (…) ROs in the main delivered because of the unstinting work, ded-
ication and professionalism of their staff. Many were forced into practices alien to normal
arrangements and probably feared the possibility of challenge or close scrutiny. Plans in many
areas were seriously compromised by the failure of suppliers and, given that this was an elec-
tion year with large parts of the country not being contested, the ramifications for a General
Election are indeed extremelyworrying.” (Association of Electoral Administrators, 2007, p.11)
Particular concerns about the state of electoral registerswere raised by theGrahamCommittee’s
review of the work of the Electoral Commission. These issues have prompted the Electoral
Commission to commission research into the accuracy and comprehensiveness of the electoral
registers and led to work within the Commission to develop performance indicators for elec-
toral administration. Issues concerning electoral registration cannot be divorced from the expe-
rience of postal voting. It is evident, for instance, thatmaximising electoral participation requires
the electoral registers to be as complete as possible. Likewise, electoral integrity and the min-
imisation of the risk of electoral fraud hinges on electoral registers being as accurate as possible.
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However, in comparison to previous decades, estimates concerning the coverage and accuracy
of electoral registers have been found to be seriouslywanting. Awidely-cited estimate for under-
registration is that 3.5 million electors (some 8 to 9 per cent of eligible voters) in England and
Wales are not on the electoral register (The Electoral Commission, 2007d). However, it is evi-
dent from interviews with senior electoral administrators that this estimate carries little or no
credence. It is also recognised that registration rates vary enormously between local authori-
ties. Recent pilot research in Greater London commissioned by the Electoral Commission sug-
gests that under-registration in individual Londonboroughsmay range from9 to 33 per cent (GfK
NOP Research, 2007). Wider survey evidence suggests that there are similar variations in levels
of registration nationally, partly reflecting contrasting practices of individual local authorities
and a general lack of resources available for the task of electoral registration, particularly in the
most deprived areas.
Measures of accuracy for the registers are evenmore difficult to derive. Rough estimates for the
number of ineligible names on the register vary from 1 to 3.5 million, but the general picture was
perhaps most accurately summarised by one interviewee for this research: “all we can really say
is that nobody really knows”. In their report for the Electoral Commission, GfK NOP Research
(2007) estimate that 2 to 3 per cent of entries on the register contain errors or missing informa-
tion relating to either the survey respondent’s name or address, but offer no indication of the
possible number of ineligible names on the register arising from instances where the elector is
deceased, fictitious, or registered in more than one local authority. There is, however, evidence
to suggest that local authorities that have sought to ‘clean up’ their registers have seen the
number of entries reduced by up to 20 per cent (Hansard, 9 Mar 2004: Column 1418W). At the
same time, several newspapers have sought to demonstrate the potential for registering ficti-
tious voters –most famously theDailyMail reported on 7th February 2004 that its staff had suc-
cessfully registered the nameGus Troobev (an anagramof ‘bogus voter’) on 31 separate electoral
registers during a single day.
Electronic voting and counting
SinceMay 2002, a variety of electronic voting procedures have been piloted across a number of
local authorities in English local council elections. In their more limited form, these pilots have
involvedmaking computer terminals available within polling stations. However, there have also
beennumerous pilots of ‘multi-channel’ electronic voting, enabling voters to cast ballots remote-
ly via the internet, telephone or SMS, oftenwith a facility for ‘advance voting’ before polling day.
While evaluation reports suggest that such forms of electoral modernisation may have a mod-
est impact in increasing turnout, it also apparent that electronic voting tends to be costly and
that the principal benefit is the provision of greater choice, largely to thosewhowould have voted
anyway. Although there is no clear evidence of fraud associated with electronic voting, the pos-
sible risks associatedwith hacking and virus attacks have beenwidely documented (Fairweather
and Rogerson, 2003).
Equally significant is the concern that electronic voting lacks the transparency of traditional
voting procedures, particularly as there is no ‘paper trail’ that can be auditedwhere disputes arise
(Independent Commission on Alternative Voting Methods, 2002). Likewise, it is clear that the
secrecy of the ballot cannot be guaranteed where remote electronic voting is permitted (Birch
andWatt, 2004). Some of themost concerning anecdotal evidence to emerge is that in one local
authority, party workers carrying out door-to-door canvassing assisted voters in casting their
votes via SMS.Many ‘e-voting’ pilots have also experienced technical problems, resulting in some-
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times lengthy periods during which specific e-voting channels became inoperable. As box 3.3
illustrates, using the case of Swindon, such problems have occurred even in local authoritieswith
themost experience of running e-voting pilots. The recognition of the significance of these prob-
lems led the Electoral Commission (2007e) to recommend that a much stronger regulatory and
policy framework should be put in place before further e-voting pilots are contemplated.
The most systematic piloting of electronic voting in the UK since 2000 has
takenplace inSwindon inWiltshire.TogetherwithSheffieldCityCouncil, Swindon
Borough Council is one of only two local authorities to have run three separate
pilots of electronic voting, at local elections held in 2002, 2003 and 2007. These
pilotshave testedavarietyof formsof electronic voting, including remotevoting
via the Internet, telephones, and digital television, as well as the use of mobile
electronic voting kiosks and laptops within polling stations. A central feature of
the approach taken in Swindon has been the use of wider initiatives to raise
awareness about local elections, particularly among ‘hard to reach voters’, and
to promote the use of electronic and postal voting. For the 2006 and 2007 local
elections, the council’s electoral services division created a MyElection website,
described as “an online election resource where voters were also able to find out
informationaboutcandidates,pollingstation locationsandother relevantelection
details”.
The experience of e-voting in Swindon therefore has significant wider relevance,
not least because the emphasis which Swindon has placed on e-voting has led to
its provisions attracting considerable attention. Senior elections staff from the
council made a presentation on e-voting to the San Diego Elections Task Force in
October 2006. In March 2007, the council was awarded beacon authority status
for its work in electoral services, with particular reference to its piloting of e-
voting and wider promotion of e-democracy. The authority was also chosen as a
key location forelectoralobservationconductedby theOpenRightsGroup (ORG)
at the 2007 local elections in England.
The three e-voting pilots in Swindon were conducted alongside the availability
of postal voting on demand and were characterised by an increasingly ambitious
approach to the promotion of ‘multi-channel voting’. In May 2002, facilities for
advance electronic voting were made available over a five day period in the run
up toelectionday, allowing registeredvoters tovoteby telephoneor the Internet.
Fifteen per cent of all votes cast in the election were cast electronically, two-
thirds of which were Internet votes. In May 2003, the pilot was extended to four
electronic voting channels – Internet, telephone, digital television, kiosks – and
the proportion of ballots cast electronically rose to 25 per cent, with two-thirds
of e-voters again using the facility for internet voting.
k
The experience of e-voting: Swindon Borough Council
BOX 3.3
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The May 2007 pilot, described by the Borough’s Director of Law and Democratic
Services as “the most ambitious and complex e-voting pilot scheme ever
undertaken in the UK”, combined advance voting facilities with provisions for
supervisedelectronic voting facilitiesonpollingday.Voters could cast their votes
in advance via remote internet or telephone or from five supervised locations,
while 64 electronic voting stations were provided on polling day. The total
proportion of votes cast via electronic channels remained static, at 24 per cent,
with remote internet voting continuing to remain by far the most popular of the
e-voting facilities.
The detailed evaluation reports of each pilot scheme produced by the Electoral
Commission (2002b, 2003d, 2007f), together with the observation report
produced by the Open Rights Group on the 2007 pilot, provide a sound evidence
base for assessing the impact and operation of e-voting in Swindon. Four sets of
key issuesemerge fromthese reportswhich, taken together, highlight significant
limitations with e-voting:
Turnout: Despite counter-claims made by Swindon Borough Council itself, the
viewexpressed inElectoralCommissionevaluation reportshas consistentlybeen
that the e-voting pilots had little or no impact on turnout. While turnout across
theBorough rose to31.2per cent in2002, a riseof 3.5percentagepoints compared
to 2000, overall turnout fell again in 2003 to 29.9 per cent, despite the e-voting
pilot thatyear. In2007,overall turnout roseagainslightly to34.5percent.Although
surveys revealed that e-voting proved popular among those making use of the
facility, thecouncil’s particular focusonusinge-voting toencourageyoungpeople
tovotedemonstratedvery limited impact. Furthermore, surveyevidencesuggests
that many e-voters would have voted anyway. A survey carried out by ICM
Research for the Electoral Commission (2007f) found that 75 per cent of remote
Internet voters, 82 per cent of telephone voters and 96 per cent of voters using
e-voting facilities at polling stations would have voted without the facility in
question.
Security: None of the three e-voting pilots produced any evidence of fraud or
malpractice and the Electoral Commission’s 2007 evaluation highlighted that 95
per centof e-voterswere confident that their votewas secure.However, both the
Commission’s report and the report produced by ORG highlight notable security
weaknesses in thesystemsused.TheORGreporthighlighted thatvoting terminals
were left unattended for periods at the Oasis leisure centre. The Electoral
Commission highlighted several relatively minor security issues which were
spotted in advance of polling day, with delays in suppliers implementing agreed
changes causing delays in the launch of advance voting services. Both ORG and
the Commission also identified security risks at the count including terminals
used for decryption and vote-tallying being left unattended and cabling linking
terminals being left exposed.
Reliability: While the 2002 and 2003 pilots ran without any significant technical
hitches, themoreambitious2007pilotswitnesseda failureofnetworkconnections
at two polling stations (Covingham and the Lawns) and a loss of wireless
connectivity affecting the laptopsprovided for votingat theOasis leisure centre.
BOX 3.3 continued
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The ORG report also suggested that numerous laptops malfunctioned: “laptops
atpolling stationsused fore-votingand liveelectronic registersprovedunreliable,
with themajorityofpolling stationsobservedexperiencingproblems” (ORG,p.2).
In addition,ORGreportedevidenceof confusionamongelection staff abouthow
todealwith voterswhile problemswithnetwork connectivitywere experienced,
given that electronic registers could not be marked at these times.
Cost: The Electoral Commission’s evaluations of the e-voting pilots consistently
highlighted the high costs of the arrangements, which were met by central
government. The Commission’s evaluation of the 2007 pilots estimated that the
cost of providing e-voting facilities was £102 for each voter making use of the
facility, compared to a cost of £2 per elector for conventional ballots.
Inshort,whileremote internetvotinghasevidentpopularitywithaspecificminority
of the electorate in Swindon, the impact on turnout has been negligible, notable
problems associated with security and reliability have been highlighted, and the
costs of providing e-voting have been demonstrated to be potentially excessive.
These conclusionswere,moreover, echoedby theElectoralCommission’s (2007e)
assessment of experience across all the 2007 e-voting pilots.
BOX 3.3 continued
A number of pilots have also been undertaken with electronic counting systems, designed to
make the process of counting votesmore efficient andmore accurate. E-counting,which involves
the use of special hardware to scan (unfolded) paper ballots, has had particular appeal where
new electoral systems have been introduced, requiring the recording and counting of multiple
preferences. From the very first large-scale pilot of e-counting, at the Greater London Authority
and Mayoral elections of May 2000, potential problems with e-counting have been evident.
Despite the concerns raised in London in 2000 and at subsequent counts in English local
authority elections, e-counting was opted for at the Scottish elections of May 2007. As was
highlighted in the introduction to this report, the failure of the e-counting system in Scotland
resulted in a large number of counts being suspendedwhich, in combinationwith a series of other
failings, led to the commissioning of an independent report on the elections. In his report, pub-
lished in October 2007, Ron Gould said that those involved in the elections had “almost without
exception treated voters as an afterthought”. Recognition of the concerns associated with e-
counting led the Electoral Commission (2007) to recommend suspensionof suchpilots in advance
of the publication of the Gould report.
As box 3.4 highlights, the parallels between the London elections of 2000 and the Scottish elec-
tions of 2007 are more than striking – they are shocking. Virtually all of the problems identified
in the GLA report of 2002 re-surfaced in the Gould report of 2007. Indeed, if the words ‘London’
and ‘Scotland’ and the dates ‘2000’ and ‘2007’ were switched in the respective documents, large
parts of either report could be read as a description of the problems experienced in the other
case. While the lessons learnt from the London elections of 2000 have ensured that similar prob-
lemswereminimised in the 2004 elections forMayor andGLA, it is deeply concerning that such a
similar pattern of events could be repeated in another part of the UK seven years later. Weighing
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Thecombinedelections for theMayorofLondonandtheGreaterLondonAssembly
(GLA) in May 2000 constituted the first large-scale pilot of electronic counting
technologies in UK elections. Following a series of problems experienced at the
count, it became evident that a very large proportion of ballot papers had been
rejected. The GLA elections, which use the Alternative Member system, had
produced rejection rates of 9.9 per cent on the constituency ballot and 5.4 per
cent on the list ballot. Meanwhile, the results of the Mayoral election, which use
the supplementary vote system, indicated that 2.3 per cent of first choice votes
for Mayor, and 16.7 per cent of the second choice votes, had been rejected.
However, further analysis indicated that thehighproportion for rejected second
preference votes on the Mayoral contest largely reflected individual electors’
wishes not to cast a second preference vote (Electoral Reform Society, 2001).
A GLA inquiry established to examine the electoral process, particularly in light
of the exceptionally high proportion of rejected votes, pointed to a number of
wider shortcomings in the planning and management of the election process
(GLA, 2002). In particular, it was found that the election had been dogged by
problems arising from:
1. Insufficient time forplanningand forelectoral administrators to takeonboard
the requirements of new legislation;
2. Additionalpressuresonelectoral administratorsarising fromthemanagement
of postal voting, including concerns about the pressures placed on the postal
service and the printing industry;
3. A lackofclarityabout rolesandresponsibilitiesandresultantpoorcoordination
among key individuals and agencies;
4. Concerns about ballot paper design and possible confusion among the
electorate about the use of different electoral systems.
With specific reference to the count, the report noted that there had been major
problems experienced with scanners rejecting large numbers of ballot papers or
sorting them for manual adjudication. In a written submission to the investigative
committee,onereturningofficerhighlightedproblemsassociatedwiththetendering
process to choose suppliers, a lack of adequate trialling, the over-sensitivity of the
scannerstosmudges,creasesandothermarksonthepaperballots,andtheovernight
count leading to fatigue and further errors by elections staff.
The LondonMayor andGreater
LondonAssembly Elections, 2000
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up the relative benefits and risks emerging from the pilot project evaluations of e-voting and e-
counting, the conclusions seem clear cut. While pilots of electronic voting have generally elicit-
ed high levels of satisfaction among survey respondents, such pilots have proved extremely
expensive and there is noevidence to suggest that e-votingoffers any significant scope for turnout
to be increased by thismeans. At the same time, serious concerns persist about the security and
transparency of e-voting systems and their vulnerability to organised fraud.Meanwhile, although
e-counting is widely deemed necessary where proportional electoral systems are in use, experi-
ence to date has highlighted serious problems associated with the deployment of such tech-
nologies. Not only has e-counting frequently failed to improve on the estimated time required
for a manual count, it has also highlighted the lack of transparency in such system, particularly
in comparison with manual counting. In circumstances such as the Scottish elections of 2007,
there is a very real danger that the use of such technologiesmay serve to undermine confidence
in the electoral process.
The elephant in the room: declining public confidence
The issue of public confidence in UK electoral processes merits urgent attention. Figure 3.2
presents data on levels of public confidence in elections for nineWest European countries, includ-
ing Great Britain, derived from surveys using identical questions following national elections
held from the late 1990s onwards.While levels of public confidence in elections are high, by inter-
national standards, across Western Europe, the figure also points to some clear variation with-
inWestern Europe. Thehighest rates of public confidence are found in the Scandinavian countries,
closely followed by Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland. By contrast, lower rates of pub-
lic confidence are recorded in the relatively ‘new’ democracies of Portugal and Spain, and also in
Iceland. However, among the ten countries for which data is available, Great Britain has the low-
est proportion of respondents declaring full confidence in electoral processes. Only 57 per cent
of those surveyed in Britain had full confidence in the fairness of the election result, compared
to 73 per cent on Germany and 88 per cent in Denmark.
Figure 3.2: Percentage of respondents expressing full confidence in election
outcomes across nine West European countries, 1997–2002
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Source: Birch, 2005
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Birch (2005) finds that measures of public confidence in elections across 28 democracies have a
strong positive correlationwith both the use of proportional representation andwith direct pub-
lic financing of political parties. The absence of such measures in the UK therefore goes some
way to explaining lower levels of public confidence, which it shares with other ‘majoritarian’
democracies such as Canada, New Zealand and the USA, where surveys suggest only 34–50 per
cent of citizens have full confidence in electoral processes. Perhapsmore surprisingly, Birch finds
that the existence of independent institutions for electoral administration, such as electoral com-
missions, appears to have a negative impact on public confidence. While paradoxical, theremay
be a rational explanation for these observed correlations. Birch suggests that, in many coun-
tries, electoral commissions have struggled to assert independent authority fromgoverning par-
ties. Where disputes break out between governing parties and electoral commissions about the
conduct of elections, public confidence may inevitably be undermined.
This observation is highly significant in the British case. Concern about public confidence in the
electoral processwas oneof the key factors behind the reforms introducedbyPPERA2000,which
established the Electoral Commission.However, since 2000, electoral politics in theUKhas been
plaguedbyprecisely thedynamicswhichBirch suggestsmay lead to suchwell-intentioned reforms
undermining public confidence. Over the past five years, the tense relationship between the
Electoral Commission and the UK government could not have done more to undermine public
confidence in the electoral process. Since 2003, the Electoral Commission has become increas-
ingly concerned about issues of ballot security. In Voting for Change and The Shape of Elections to
Come, both published in 2003, advocated more robust security measures for postal voting, for
legislation defining new offences concernedwith postal ballots, and for the introduction of indi-
vidual registration. However the Commission’s proposals fell on deaf ears, at least within gov-
ernment. Instead, the Department for Constitutional Affairs chose to ignore the Commission’s
advice by pushing ahead with proposals for all-postal pilots in four English regions at the com-
bined European Parliament and local elections of June 2004. The subsequent fall out from the
Birmingham election petitions of 2004, allied with the wider problems arising from the 2004
all-postal ballots, prompted the Electoral Commission to effectively reverse its position onpostal
voting in local elections. Having previously supported a move to all-postal ballots for local elec-
tions, providing further safeguards were provided, the Commission now argued in Delivering
Democracy (2004):
“All-postal voting should not be pursued for use at future statutory elections or referendums in
theUK, and the option of sending ballot papers automatically to every registered elector should
not be pursued.” (Electoral Commission, 2004)
The Electoral Commission has been left increasingly frustrated by the government’s refusal to
accept many of its key recommendations, almost all of which reflect conclusions also reached
by the Association of Electoral Administrators, international election observers, and academic
experts. Thatmuchof this standoff betweengovernmentMinisters and the Electoral Commission
has concerned the government’s rejection of proposals for measures to enhance the security of
the ballot, merely serves to underline the problem.
There are no comparative data from equivalent surveys since 2002 to assess whether there has
been such a decline in overall public confidence in UK elections relative to other European
countries. However, there is clear evidence to suggest that public confidence in UK elections
has declined further over the past decadewhere postal voting has beenwidely used. In June 2004,
33 per cent of those surveyed thought that postal voting was fairly or very unsafe from fraud.
Eleven months later, in the wake of the Blackburn and Birmingham judgments, 46 per cent
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expressed such concerns, with virtually the same proportion (44 per cent) subsequently offer-
ing the sameassessment in Spring 2006 (Electoral Commission, 2006).Moreover, while the 2004
survey data had suggested that 67 per cent of the public felt postal voting to be safe from fraud,
this figure fell to 51 per cent among residents in the regions where all-postal voting was piloted
and to 46 per cent for British Asian voters (Curtice et al, 2004). Among those that had voted in
2006, almost a quarter suggested that fraudwas a problem,mainly citingmedia coverage to jus-
tify this claim (Electoral Commission, 2006).
The task of rebuilding public confidence in the electoral process is perhaps themost urgent con-
cern that emerges from the analysis presented in this chapter. High-profile cases of fraud have
highlighted vulnerabilities in the electoral system, which have been exposed further by inves-
tigative journalism. It is also likely that public confidence has been influenced by administrative
shortcomings associatedwith postal voting,which have highlighted the under-resourcing of elec-
toral administration, as well as the often unrealistic timescales within which complex legal and
technical changes have had to be introduced into electoral processes. As several interviewees
highlighted during the research for this report, there are few, if any, instances in living memory
of the integrity of UK electoral administrators and returning officers being called into question.
It would be a tragedy if this confidence in the integrity of our electoral administration were to
be undermined by the sheer weight of pressures being imposed upon it.
There are, however, further factors influencing public confidence in elections. Most notably,
Birch’s (2005) comparative research suggests that the existence of limits on campaign spending
correlates negatively with public confidence in the electoral process. To explain this apparent
paradox, Birch highlights the tendency across many democracies for such regulations to be
breached. As such, rules about the registering of donations or limits on campaign spendingmay
serve principally to highlight examples of abuse, with the result that “blatant violation of these
regulations by political parties and candidates may lead to a worsening in perceptions of elec-
toral integrity on the part of the ordinary citizen” (Birch, 2005, pp.20–21). There are grounds to
suggest, therefore, that recent revelations concerning Labour Party breaches of the rules con-
cerning the registering of donations with the Electoral Commission are likely to have further
undermined public confidence in the electoral process. Yet, as the following chapter will show,
the problems associated with the role of money in shaping UK electoral outcomes run much
deeper than failures to adhere to the rules governing the declaration of donations.
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The problem of election finance
There is widespread agreement that democratic elections require some form of control over
financial expenditure designed to persuade voters to opt for a particular party or candidate.
Indeed,much legislation internationally has taken its original inspiration from theUK,where lim-
its on individual candidate expenditurewere introduced as part of theCorrupt and Illegal Practice
Act of 1883. However, as with other aspects of electoral law, this Victorian legacy was left large-
ly untouched formore than 100years. Candidate limits thus remained theprincipalmeans through
which expenditure at British general elections was regulated until the passage of PPERA 2000,
which introduced caps for national expenditure on election campaigns (Ewing, 2007). There are,
moreover, remarkable parallels between contemporary debates and controversies surrounding
party funding and the earlier periods of British political history. The original ‘cash for honours’
scandal centred on the activities of the Liberal PrimeMinister, David LloydGeorge, between 1916
and 1922, while some of the most expensive elections in British political history were conduct-
ed in the inter-war years, primarily as a result of lavishConservative spending (Pinto-Duschinsky,
1981). In 1929, the Conservatives outspent Labour by a ratio of roughly 7:1, prompting the new
PrimeMinister, RamsayMacDonald, to establish anElectoralConference chairedbyLordUllswater,
with the aim of reaching agreement between the parties on limiting election spending (Linton,
1993). However, the most significant trends since 1945, and particularly since the clarification in
the case of Rex v Tronoh Mines (1952) that spending limits applied only to expenditure support-
ing a named candidate, has been the growth in spending on national election campaigns.
Chapter Four:
Cash for constituencies?
“On Friday, 6 May 2005, the day after the election (…) Stephen
Gilbert worked out how the candidates we had supported
financially compared with those who had not received our support.
It soon became clear that we had been wasting neither our time
nor our resources. Of the thirty-three candidates who had won
seats from Labour or the Liberal Democrats, no fewer that twenty-
five had receives support from the fund that I had set up with
Leonard Steinberg and the Midlands Industrial Council.”
Michael Ashcroft (2005, p. 295)
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Note: This figure is presented primarily to illustrate broad trends, particularly in relation to party spending. Political parties were
not required to report on their levels of election spending prior to 2001. Data on party spending for the period 1945–1987 are
derived from a common methodology (Pinto-Duschinksy 1981, 1985, 1989), although the author of these works notes particular
difficulties estimating Conservative spending in 1945, 1950 and 1966. Since 2001, figures for party spending have been compiled
by the Electoral Commission; changes in regulations since 2001 render strict comparison between 2001 and 2005 problematic.
All spending has been converted to 2005 prices using the Retail Price Index.
Sources: Ewing (2007); Pinto-Duschinksy (1981, 1985, 1989); Linton (1993); Committee on Standards in
Public Life (1998); Electoral Commission (2005)
Figure 4.1: Combined national party campaign spending and local candidate
spending at UK General Elections, 1945–2005 (£ million, in 2005 prices)
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Figure 4.1 presents the broad trends in party and candidate spending at general elections since
1945. While the data on which this figure is based are subject to a number of caveats, particu-
larly in relation to estimates for party expenditure prior to 2001, a number of significant trends
can be identified. First, combined expenditure by election candidates, when measured in real
terms, fell sharply between 1945 and 1955 but thereafter stabilised, with only very minor fluctu-
ations at £14 to 15 million (measured in 2005 prices). Second, the balance of election spending
has shifted from expenditure incurred by candidates locally to expenditure incurred by parties
nationally. In 1945, individual candidates accounted for around90per cent of total election spend-
ing, but by 1997, the candidate share of election spending had fallen to approximately 20per cent.
Third, the absence of any caps on centralised election expenditure before 2000promptednation-
al party spending to rise dramatically during the post-war period, peaking initially in 1964, and
then again in 1997. National election spending rose sharply at each election after 1979, with the
record level of expenditure in 1997 representing the culmination of a spending ‘arms race’ in
British politics during the 1990s (Ewing, 2007, p.5). The sharp fall in 2001 was as much a reflec-
tion of the perilous financial state of the parties as it was a direct product of the imposition of
expenditure caps, since all three main parties spent well within the imposed limits.
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Public spending and the benefits of incumbency
How, and to what extent, money influences electoral outcomes in the UK is difficult to assess,
although there is general agreement about the range of ways in which such an influencemay be
felt. It is widely argued, for instance, that campaign promises, particularly thosemade by incum-
bents, may be considered as a form of ‘collective bribe’. Searle (1987) notes how the regulations
contained in the 1883Corrupt and Legal PracticeAct, combinedwith the emergence of a stronger
party system, prompted responsibility for election finance to transfer progressively to party head-
quarters. He argues this was “a development which arguably gave rise to new kinds of corrup-
tion, but which greatly reduced the level of traditional malpractice” (p.7). The sales of honours
associatedwithDavid LloydGeorge’s period as PrimeMinister is perhaps themost obvious exam-
ple of this trend. However, earlier than this, concerns emerged that targeted state expenditure
was being used to sway voters. During the campaign for the Wicks Burghs by-election in 1913,
the Scottish Liberal Whip, John Gullard, promised voters governmental funds for harbour rede-
velopment via theDevelopmentCommission if they returned the Liberal Candidate, JohnMunro.
Subsequent controversy surroundingMunro’s unexpected election and the alleged ‘harbour bribe’
ultimately promptedPrimeMinister Asquith to apologise for the “error of judgement”. TheWicks
Burgh case has a direct parallel inmore recent times. In 1966, facing a possible defeat at the Hull
North by-election in 1966, which would have reduced the Labour government’s majority to one,
theMinister for Transport, BarbaraCastle, announcedplans for a bridge across theHumber. Forty
years on, in an article entitled ‘How I won Hull £345 million’, Richard Gott, a Guardian journalist
who stood as an Independent candidate at the 1966 by-election, described Castle’s decision as
“possibly the most expensive electoral bribe in history” (Guardian, 2006).
For sitting MPs, the principal advantages of incumbency include:
• Free publicity gained via local media coverage of events and ongoing
campaigns;
• Free access to the postal service when writing to constituents;
• A communications allowance to facilitate (non-partisan) contacts with
constituentsvianewsletters,websites,newspaperadvertisingandothermedia.
For thepartyofgovernment, theprincipal advantagesof incumbencymay include:
• Scope to set an election date based on opinion polls and the economic cycle;
• Theoption tobookupkeybillboard sitesprior toannouncing theelectiondate;
• The possibility to manage fiscal policy to maximise electoral advantage;
• Scope to manage party spending prior to announcing the date of the election
in order to maximise scope to concentrate spending during the campaign
period.
Source: Ewing, 2007; Johnston and Pattie, 2008
The benefits of incumbency
BOX 4.1
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The view that governing parties seek to influence elections via targeted local expenditure has
been argued to have application beyond these examples of ‘must win’ by-elections. John and
Ward (2001) argue that the UK’s majoritarian model of democracy encourages central manipu-
lation of public spending allocations for partisan advantage, and they provide evidence to sug-
gest that Conservative governments targeted central grants to local authorities in marginal
constituencies, particularly from the late 1980s, in a bid to secure subsequent electoral advan-
tage. Whether or not we choose to regard such governmental expenditure as a form of ‘collec-
tive bribe’, it is widely accepted that incumbents, particularly those representing the governing
party, generally start election campaigns with a significant advantage (see box 4.1). In recent
years, these debates surrounding the potential advantages enjoyed by MPs from the governing
party have become increasingly bound up with wider controversies surrounding party funding
that have dominated the numerous reviews conducted since 1998 (see box 4.2). Inevitably, such
disagreements centre on those ‘loopholes’ in the current legislation which may offer scope for
individual parties to acquire a specific, partisan advantage. Currently, this dispute has drawn
attention back to issues surrounding the advantages enjoyedby incumbents andwhether sharply
divergent levels of donations to local constituency parties undermine the notion of a “level
playing field” (Ewing, 2007).
1998: The Neill Committee report on The Funding of Political Parties in the
United Kingdom recommends the introduction of expenditure limits for
national party campaigns at general elections.
2000: ThePolitical Parties Elections andReferendaAct introducesexpenditure
limits and establishes the Electoral Commission.
2004: The Electoral Commission’s report on the funding of political parties
recommends a reduction in national spending limits and a significant
increase in candidate spending limits.
2006: In the immediate wake of controversies surrounding undisclosed loans
takenoutby themajorparties in the runup to the2005General Election,
the Prime Minister announces the Review of the Funding of Political
Parties to be conducted by Sir Hayden Phillips (March). Soon after, the
government moves an amendment to the Electoral Administration Bill
introducing regulations to ensure loans to political parties are disclosed
to the Electoral Commission (April).
2006: Publication of Constitutional Affairs Select Committee Report on Party
Funding (December).
2007: The report of thePhillips reviewoutlinesproposals for tighter regulation
of donations and ‘thirty party’ spending, reduced general election
campaignexpenditureandanenhancedrole for theElectoralCommission.
The report also advocates inter-party talks as the only means of taking
forward this set of proposals (March).
2007: Breakdownofparty talks chairedbyPhillips,withpartiesunable toagree
on principles for augmenting caps on single donations with caps on
individual donor contributions (October).
Sources: Ewing, 2007; Gay et al, 2007.
Key developments in the regulation of party finance
and election campaign spending, 1998–2006
BOX 4.2
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Why candidate spending still matters
While overall candidate spending at general elections has remained fairly stable for five decades,
candidate expenditure associatedwith themain three parties has declined in real terms. In 2005,
the average campaign expenditure of Conservative and Labour candidates had fallen to 78 per
cent of the levels spent by their counterparts in 1970. Liberal Democrat candidates standing at
the 2005 General Election spent, on average, 59 per cent of the amount spent by Liberal Party
candidates in 1970. Taking a longer-term perspective, the average campaign expenditure of can-
didates from all three parties in 2005 was about a third of the level of spending at the 1945 elec-
tion (see table 4.1). However, there is also a second significant trend: the geographical targeting
of campaign spending. As table 4.2 shows, all three parties spend considerablymore in seats they
are defending at a general election and considerably less in seats in which they start as the
third-placed party. The targeting of resources to defend seats is most obvious in the case of the
LiberalDemocrats. In the 52 seats theywonat the 2001General Election, average LiberalDemocrat
candidate spending in 2005 was 2.5 times the average for the party’s 626 candidates as a whole.
The converse tendency – for third-placed candidates to under-spend relative to their party aver-
age – ismost evident in the case of the Labour Party. Among Labour candidates notionally start-
ing from a third-place position, spending was just 45 per cent of the average for all Labour
candidates (see table 4.2 for full details).
*Data refers to the Liberal Party in 1945, 1970 and 1979, to the SDP/Liberal Alliance in 1987,
and to the Liberal Democrats in 1992 and 2005.
Sources: Pinto-Duschinsky, 1989, p.205; Linton, 1993, p.26; Johnston and Pattie, 2008, appendix 1.
Table 4.1: Average spending by the candidates of the three main parties
at select general elections, 1970–2005, £s, measured in 2005 prices
(1945 included for historical comparison)
1970
£
1979
£
1987
£
1992
£
2005
£
(1945)
£
Conservative 9,830 7,419 8,291 8,096 7,699 (22,422)
Labour 8,577 6,427 7,349 7,056 6,690 (17,104)
‘Liberal’* 6,909 3,432 6,406 4,393 4,055 (15,293)
Source: Derived from Johnston and Pattie, 2008, appendix 1.
Table 4.2: Average spending by the candidates of the three main parties
at the 2005 General Election, £s
Average
(all seats)
£
Average
(1st place in 2001)
£
Average
(3rd place in 2001)
£
Conservative 7,699 9,621 4,300
Labour 6,690 8,376 3,045
Liberal Democrat 4,055 10,705 2,777
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This practice of political parties targeting their resources at marginal seats is by no means new:
the practice has beenhighlighted inmanyof theNuffieldCollege studies of post-war British elec-
tions, including those relating to the 1950, 1970, February 1974, October 1974 and 1983 General
Elections (c.f., Johnston, 1987). However, as Johnston notes, the view expressed consistently in
these studies was that variations in local candidate spending had little impact on election out-
comes; general elections were increasingly held to represent “a national battle rather than the
sum of disparate local struggles” (Butler and Kavanagh, 1983, p.267, cited in Johnston 1987, p.35).
Yet, if campaign spending has no discernible impact on election results, the targeting strategies
adopted by the political parties at each general election for five decades would appear to be
irrational. In fact, more systematic attempts to measure the impact of constituency spending
suggest that the parties are behaving in an entirely rational manner. In a series of publications,
Ron Johnston andCharles Pattie have challenged the ‘conventionalwisdom’ of theNuffield stud-
ies (Johnston, 1987; Johnston and Pattie, 1997, 2006, 2007, 2008). The key conclusions reached
in Johnston and Pattie’s work are fourfold:
• Parties behave rationally in seeking to target money at the seats where it is likely to
have greatest impact;
• Higher levels of expenditure improve a candidate’s electoral performance, taking into
account other factors, although the impact is greatest where the candidate is the prin-
cipal challenger to the incumbent;
• Levels of expenditure are best understood as the most viable proxy measure of the
intensity of a party’s local campaign, while also bearing in mind that campaign activi-
ty and campaign funds are often indivisible;
• There is growing evidence that the capacity of a party to run a ‘long campaign’ (i.e.,
throughout and across parliamentary cycles), rather than just in the official six week
campaign period, will further enhance the impact of local expenditure.
Money and themarginals
Johnston andPattie’s research also poses something of a conundrum for local parties.With party
membership and activism falling dramatically, the scope for local parties to generate income for
constituency campaigns – throughmembership dues and traditional forms of fund-raising – has
diminished significantly. Meanwhile the prioritisation of national election campaigns has limit-
ed the extent to which national parties channel funds to local parties: most resources travel the
opposite way, i.e., from local parties to national headquarters. Increasingly, local parties seeking
to run an extensive campaign must rely on direct donations, just as the parties must do nation-
ally in an election year. Consequently, large sums of money raised through donations are likely
to be a significant factor influencing the performance of a party’s candidate in a general election
(Johnston and Pattie, 2007). Using the Electoral Commission’s register of donations to political
parties for the period February 2001 to December 2005, Johnston and Pattie (2007) isolate the
donationsmade directly to local parties and identify striking variations in the practice of Labour
and Conservative donors. Donations made to constituency Labour parties from 2001 to 2005,
particularly donations from individual trade unions, were often directed at relatively safe seats
in Labour’s ‘heartlands’ rather than at key marginal seats. By contrast, Conservative donors
appeared to be “more strategic than their Labour counterparts”, with donations clearly focussed
on marginal constituencies.
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Table 4.3, derived from Johnston andPattie’s data, illustrates someof their key findings. The table
summarises the donations made to constituency parties in England and Wales fighting margin-
al seats at the 2005 General Election, defined here as seats which each of the threemain parties
won or lost in 2001 by margins of up to 4 per cent. Defined in this way, each of the three parties
contested 45marginal seats in 2005. The table underlines the disproportionate capacity of local
Conservative parties to attract funding through donations, relative to other local parties. From
July 2001 to June 2005, the 45 Conservative parties in themost marginal seats received just over
£1 million in donations: treble the sum of donations to the 45 Liberal Democrat marginals, and
quadruple that reaching the 45 local Labour parties fightingmarginal seats. The data in table 4.3
also underlines the extent to which donations to Conservative constituency parties rose in the
period immediately before the 2005 General Election. From July 2001 to June 2004, just under
half of the 45 local Conservative parties received donations, amounting to just over £250,000 in
total. However, from July 2004 to June 2005 around nine-tenths of local Conservative parties in
these marginals received donations, amounting to £784,390 in total (an average of £19,600 per
constituency party). By contrast, there was no significant rise in either the number or the value
of donations to Labour and Liberal Democrat marginals, where local parties received an average
of £6,429 and £7,721 respectively.
Note: For the purposes of this table, a party is defined as fighting a marginal seat in 2005 where it won or lost that seat at the
2001 General Election by a margin of up to 4 per cent
Source: Derived from Johnston and Pattie, 2007, pp.376–7
These contrasts reflect both the greater level of total donationsmade to local Conservatives par-
ties and the more strategic approach adopted by donors. Of the £3.3 million made available to
Conservative constituency parties in England andWales in the year up to the 2005 election, one
quarter of the total went to the 45 tightest Conservative marginals (see table 4.4).
Table 4.3: Cash donations to constituency parties in England and Wales fighting
marginal seats at the 2005 General Election, during
a) July 2001 – June 2004 and b) July 2004 – June 2005
No.
constituencies
Constituencies
with donations
(period a)
Sum value of
donations
(period a)
£
Constituencies
with donations
(period b)
Sum value of
donations
(period b)
£
Conservative 45 22 250,794 40 784,390
Labour 45 21 111,778 22 141,451
Liberal Democrat 45 17 176,267 22 169,869
Source: Derived from Johnston and Pattie, 2007, pp.376–7
Table 4.4: Cash donations to constituency parties in England and Wales,
July 2004 – June 2005, by marginality of seat at 2005 General Election
Seats won/lost by
0–4% in 2001
Seats won/lost by
0–9% in 2001 All seats
Conservative 784,390 (24%) 1,545,490 (47%) 3,268,740 (100%)
Labour 141,451 (10%) 401,136 (28%) 1,450,037 (100%)
Liberal Democrat 169,869 (21%) 345,033 (42%) 813,096 (100%)
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This targeting of donations has, moreover, been facilitated by the deliberate choices of a small
number of donors. As table 4.5 shows, three donors accounted for 39 per cent of all donations
made to local Conservative parties from July 2004 to June 2005. Collectively, BearwoodCorporate
Services, the Midlands Industrial Council and Lord Leonard Steinberg made donations to
around 100 local partieswith a combined value of £1.28million in the year before the 2005General
Election. The ongoing controversies surrounding the role of these donors have presented amajor
stumbling block for talks on the reformof party funding (Ewing, 2007; Johnston andPattie, 2007).
The significance of the donations relates specifically to their potential impact on electoral out-
comes in the seats to which they have been directed. Analysis of the breakdown of donations to
local parties inmarginal seats in England in the year up to the 2005 General Election (see appendix
D for full tables) reveals four very clear patterns across the 35 seats for which data were collected:
• Donations to local Conservative parties exceeded those to the party seeking to defend,
or take, the seat from the Conservatives by a ratio of 3:1 in Conservative-Labour mar-
ginals, and 4:1 in Conservative-Liberal Democrat marginals.
• Sixteen candidates received substantial donations fromBearwoodCorporate Services,
a company owned and controlled byMichael Ashcroft. The ‘Ashcroftmoney’ alonewas
roughly equal to the sum of all Labour donations in the Conservative-Labour margin-
als and to all Liberal Democrat donations in the Conservative-Liberal Democrat mar-
ginals.
• While donors to all three parties made donations to multiple local parties in marginal
constituencies, the size of Conservative donations were of a different order. In the 15
Conservative-LiberalDemocrat contests, a total of £145,301was contributedbyBearwood
Corporate Services and theMidlands Industrial Council, whereas the sum contributed
by Waging Peace to seven local Liberal Democrat parties was £9,750.
• The contribution of sixmajor trade unions to local Labour parties failed to emulate the
sums injected by three donors to Conservative marginals. Combined donations from
Bearwood Corporate Services, the Midlands Industrial Council and Lord Steinberg to
the top 20Conservative-Labourmarginals amounted to £247,939 (49.8 per cent of dona-
tions received by these parties). The total amount contributed directly by six unions to
Labour campaigns in these seats was £53,265 (33 per cent of the donations received by
Labour). The principal contribution from a single organisation to these Labour mar-
ginals came from GMB, with five donations equivalent to £31,775.
Source: Derived from Johnston and Pattie, 2007, pp.376–7
Table 4.5: Principal donors to local Conservative parties, July 2004 – June 2005
Name of donor
No. of local
parties to which
donations made
Sum value of
donations made
£
Bearwood Corporate Services 73 806,200
Midlands Industrial Council 26 376,040
Lord Steinberg 5 95,907
TOTAL 104 1,278,147
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Michael Ashcroft’s strategy of directing resources to local parties, developed in conjunctionwith
other major donors, is outlined in his autobiography Dirty Politics, Dirty Times (Ashcroft, 2005).
There is little doubt that the strategy works. By donating large sums to local parties up to a year
in advance of the 2005 election campaign, Conservative candidates were able to engage in well-
resourced ‘long campaigns’ in order to maximise electoral support. Despite an increase in their
share of the vote of only 0.6% in 2005, and a modest 3 per cent swing from Labour to the
Conservatives, the Conservatives gained 33 seats. One third of Conservative gains from Labour
were achieved with local swings of 5 per cent or more. At the same time, an otherwise success-
ful Liberal Democrat campaign was undermined by the failure of Liberal Democrat candidates
to unseat sitting Conservatives in key marginals. The shoring up of Conservative campaigns
through the injection of significant resources is the obvious explanation for the above-average
performance of Conservative candidates in such marginal seats. As a result, the key question to
be posed is not whether the ‘Ashcroft strategy’ works, but whether it raises issues about the
coverage of PPERA 2000. Although the approach taken by the Conservatives in 2005 was fully
within the law, it may be argued that it represents a challenge to the principles on which spend-
ing limits are based. As a result, growing calls have been made for new legislation to extend
local spending limits across full cycles.
In his letter to the then PrimeMinister, Tony Blair, which accompanied his report of recommen-
dations on party funding reforms in March 2007, Sir Hayden Phillips stated, “There is, in my
view, an overriding public interest in acting now to reform party funding. Achieving this will
require tough decisions on all sides, particularly about donation limits and spending limits”.
However, the breakdown of subsequent party talks has largely arisen from the issues raised by
the targeting of donations to support local party activity between general elections. Conservative
Party candidates in marginal seats justify the strategies adopted byMichael Ashcroft and other
major donors with reference to the advantages enjoyed by incumbents, particularly those rep-
resenting the governing Labour Party. There is, however, strong evidence to suggest that many
of the benefits of incumbency canbe countered via effective local campaigns. Johnston andPattie
(2008) find that a challenger’s spending during an election campaign has a far greater impact
than that of the incumbent, providing challengers with a significant ‘catch up’ effect. To a large
extent, moreover, thesemessages have been internalised by the political parties and have come
to play an increasingly important part in their electoral strategies. The great tragedy is that such
strategies, which tend to have a significant impact on voter turnout, are targeted at the tiny
minority of voters who happen to live in marginal constituencies. Indeed, the implications aris-
ing from the targeting of donations and campaign spending, particularly in relation to the con-
cerns about turnout, are among the most neglected areas of analysis in contemporary debate
about UK elections.
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Conclusions…
and lessons fromNorthern Ireland
The relative lack of research into electoral processes in theUK, particularly prior to 2000, is strik-
ing. In particular, it would appear that the previously widespread assumption that British elec-
tions were ‘free and fair’ has meant that there has effectively been no research on electoral
malpractice in the UK (Stewart, 2006). Moreover, despite the enormous volume, and high qual-
ity, of research conducted and commissioned by the Electoral Commission since 2000, signifi-
cant areas of the evidence base remains virtually non-existent. This dearth of research has
constituted a major failing in the context of rapidly changing electoral policy in the UK. All too
often, genuine concerns have been dismissed on the basis that there is ‘no evidence’ to under-
pin the claims beingmade or that the only evidence available is merely anecdotal. In actual fact,
the evidence base is arguably too deficient to establish anything other than ‘working hypothe-
ses’ about a number of key issues such as the state of the electoral registers or trends in elec-
toral malpractice in the UK.
While there is no hard evidence suggesting a significant increase in electoral malpractice since
2000, the extension of postal voting has significantly enhanced the vulnerability of UK elec-
tions to large-scale fraud. It is equally clear that absentee voting of any form significantly
increases the risk of fraud and the scale of fraud that it potentially possible. TheBirminghamelec-
tion court of 2005 demonstrates that the control of amajor city council or the outcome of a par-
liamentary contest could be influenced by the scale of fraud thatwas rendered possible by postal
voting. Electoral legislation has had to play ‘catch up’ with this reality in recent years, although
there is widespread agreement that the provisions introduced by the Electoral Administration
Act 2006 still fall short of what is required. As such, it is difficult to refute the view recently
expressed by the formerChair of theCommittee on Standards in Public Life that the government
appears to be ‘in denial’ about the challenges to the integrity of UK elections.
Reforms introducedwith the intention of raising turnout have,without doubt, dented public con-
fidence in the electoral system, whichwas already low by European standards. Instead of engag-
ingwith such concerns, the government reiterated its determination inNovember 2007 to “further
develop our electoral modernisation strategy”, using existing legislative provisions and further
piloting of alternative electoral arrangements. It is the centrality of the concern to find a rela-
tively ‘quick fix’ to the problem of declining turnouts, particularly among ministers, that has
caused such a variety of genuine concerns, and valid evidence, to be overlooked. Randall (2005,
p.409) has argued the consistent tendency to refute the validity of such concerns suggests that
“group think was apparent in the way in which the reform of the system was proposed, accept-
ed and adopted in the late 1990s”. Most significantly, the likelihood of such fraud occurring
could have beenpredicted on the basis of evidence of growing proxy vote fraud during the 1990s.
At the same time, there is an urgent need for all those involved in UK elections to accept that
the causes of low turnout are far more fundamental that the extent to which voting procedures
are ‘modern’ or ‘convenient’, although the role of such factors should not be dismissed entirely.
Ironically, however, some of the core reasons for declining turnout may well arise from the
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patterns of party funding that have become clearer as a result of the requirements of PPERA
2000. In particular, emerging evidence points to the interplay between the ‘First Past the Post’
system of elections and the geographical contrasts in local campaign spending as a potentially
significant factor in explaining low turnout in many constituencies. Appendix A to this report
presents a brief case study of the 2005General Election onMerseyside,which highlights the pos-
sible relationship between turnout and geographical variations in local campaign spending.
One of the most damaging legacies of these reforms has been their negative impact on elec-
toral administration. As the Electoral Commission (2007c) state: “in many areas of the UK we
have noted concerns that the current structure for the delivery of electoral administration is
close to breaking point and we believe it is insufficiently robust and coordinated to meet the
challenges of elections in the twenty-first century”. However, the extent to which these issues
have been considered seriously by ministers and civil servants is difficult to gauge. Certainly, it
would appear that little account was apparently taken of the fragile state of electoral adminis-
tration arrangements in the Prime Minister’s initial plans to call a snap general election. The
nature of the ‘lucky escape’ represented by the ‘General Election that never was’ is underpinned
by the fact that the conclusions reached in this report reinforce the findings of a number of recent
reviews and commentaries onBritish electoral procedures. As such, the recommendations of the
Committee on Standards in Public Life’s review of the work of the Electoral Commission, as well
as the Commission’s subsequent response to these recommendations, and to the Gould report
on the Scottish elections in 2007, provide at least part of the route map towards future reform.
The Electoral Commission has signalled its intention to lead a detailed reviewof the current legal
and policy frameworks for elections in the UK. This is a welcome initiative and, outside of min-
isterial circles, there is widespread appetite for such a debate.
It would be presumptuous to seek to pre-empt the conclusions which may be reached by the
Electoral Commission’s review. However, in relation to legislative frameworks, the possibility
cannot be dismissed that root and branch reform of British electoral law and administration is
required, as opposed to further consolidation of legislation and administrative procedures orig-
inating in the nineteenth century. The nature of this taskmay be less onerous than itwould seem.
It has been widely noted in recent reviews of UK election procedures that many viable solutions
to the problems that have emerged in recent years are already in place in one part of the UK. In
parallel with the broader reviews of electoral processes in the UK carried out after Labour came
to power in 1997, separate reviews were undertaken examining the issues arising from the expe-
rience of elections inNorthern Ireland. These reviews included the report of theNorthern Ireland
Affairs Select Committee (1998) on Electoral Malpractice in Northern Ireland and the Northern
Ireland Office’s (1998) report Administering Elections in Northern Ireland. These inquiries were
undertaken because of a widespread concern that, in contrast to the rest of the UK, electoral
malpractice remained widespread in Northern Ireland, despite the measures introduced in the
Elections (Northern Ireland) Act of 1985. Yet despite the widespread perception that electoral
malpracticewas taking place in specific parts of the province, concrete evidence of fraud proved
elusive. As the Northern Ireland Select Committee’s (1998) report noted:
“There have been many allegations of voting fraud, in particular made by representatives of
political parties, but the allegations have not always been precise.Much of the evidence of fraud
is anecdotal and circumstantial. Gossip has not translated into hard evidence. In particular,
there is a notable lack of concrete information on the prevalence of voting fraud. As a result,
the extent of the problem is hard to define.” (Paragraph 46)
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Despite the lack of clear evidence, the Northern Ireland Select Committee took the view that it
was likely that electoral malpractice was a serious problem in Northern Ireland and required the
introduction of urgent measures to minimise the scope for ‘vote stealing’. At the centre of this
analysis was a concern about the extent of inaccuracies in the electoral register, particularly the
‘inflation’ of the register throughmultiple and false entries. The Select Committee recommend-
ed measures to improve the accuracy of electoral registers and tighter controls over absentee
voting in Northern Ireland. As a result, the provisions in the Representation of the People Act
2000 for absentee voting (postal voting on demand) and for electoral pilots were not extended
toNorthern Ireland. Instead, the recommendations of the Select Committeewere translated into
the 2001 White Paper ‘Combating Electoral Fraud in Northern Ireland’ and ultimately formed
the basis for the Electoral Fraud (Northern Ireland) Act 2002.
The Act introduced a range of measures intended to address inaccuracies in the
electoral register for Northern Ireland and to reduce the opportunities for
malpractice in elections. The key elements of the reforms introduced by the Act,
as supplementedbyprovisions in theNorthern Ireland (MiscellaneousProvisions)
Act 2006, and developed through their implementation by the Electoral Office
for Northern Ireland may be summarised as follows:
• Individual registration: thesystemofhousehold registrationhasbeenreplaced
by one of individual registration. Under the new system, individual electors,
rather thanheadsofhousehold, are required tocompleteelectoral registration
forms.
• Personal identifiers: voter registration forms require electors to confirm their
name and address and provide a signature and two personal identifiers (their
dateofbirthandnational insurancenumber).National insurancenumbers are
subsequently checked against records held by the Department for Work and
Pensions.
• Rolling registration: theannual canvassofelectorshasbeenabolished in favour
of a system of rolling registration.
• Photographic ID: all electors must produce one of four forms of valid,
photographic identificationwhenattendingapolling station: adriving license,
apassport, a senior-citizensbuspass, or anElectoral IDcard. Electoral IDcards
are available free on request to all registered voters.
Five years on from the new measures being introduced, there is ample evidence
of their success. In particular:
• The problem of over-registration has been tackled, while ensuring that the
coverage of the register is as comprehensive as possible. Registration rates
fell from the ‘unrealistic’ level of 96.6 per cent in 2001 to 81.7 per cent in
2006, with subsequent registration campaigns restoring the level to 84.4 per
cent by late 2007 (Bain, 2007, p.7); k
The Electoral Fraud (Northern Ireland) Act 2002
BOX 5.1
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• Surveys of Northern Irish voters indicate widespread support for the new
measures. In 2003, 70 per cent of those surveyed felt the registration system
would reduce fraud and 74 per cent felt it would make voting more secure
(Millward Brown Ulster, 2003). Following the 2007 elections to the Northern
Ireland Assembly, 80 per cent of those surveyed expressed satisfaction with
the systemof voter registrationand56per cent agreed that theywere serving
to reduce the extent of electoral fraud (Ipsos Mori, 2007);
• There has been a marked decline in the disproportionately high number of
tendered ballots issued in Northern Ireland, previously seen as potential
evidence of widespread personation. At the 2005 General Election just 55
tendered ballots were issued in Northern Ireland (EONI, 2005), compared to
over 900 at the 1983 General Election (Mitchell and Gillespie, p.71).
In lightof this, andother, evidence, there is agrowingsupport forextendingsome,
or all, of the measures currently specific to Northern Ireland to the rest of the
UK.TheElectoralCommission (2007c) argues that thechanges introducedby the
2002Act “have improvedpublic confidenceon the integrityofelectoral processes
in Northern Ireland” (p.7) and advocated that “lessons from the experience in
Northern Ireland (…) can be used to inform a realistic and robust plan for
implementing individual registration inGreatBritain” (p.8). The sameconclusion
is reached in theCouncil of Europe’s (2008) report, inwhich the rapporteurs “urge
the British authorities to introduce a system of individual registration with
appropriatepersonal identifiers” and“strongly recommendtheBritishauthorities
to consider introducing in Great Britain the other security measures contained
in the Electoral Fraud (Northern Ireland) Act of 2002” (p.19).
BOX 5.1 continued
As box 5.1 summarises, over the past decade, electoral reforms introduced in Northern Ireland
have provided for more accurate electoral registers, strengthened the role of electoral adminis-
tration, sharply reduced accusations ofmalpractice, and raised public confidence in the electoral
process. Introducing the second reading of The Electoral Fraud (Northern Ireland) Bill in the
House of Commons on 10 July 2001, Desmond Browne MP, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary
of State for Northern Ireland, justified the new measures in the following terms:
“There has been growing concern about the perceived level of electoralmalpractice inNorthern
Ireland. The Government have a commitment to protecting the right to free and fair elections.
Of course, electoral fraud is a crime. Electoral abuse is an affront to democracy and we are
determined to combat it wherever it occurs. If there is a high level of abuse, or even if people
only fear that that is the case, the democratic process will be under threat.We do not want vot-
ers in Northern Ireland to become disillusioned with politics because they fear that elections
are unfair.” (Hansard, 10 July 2001, Column 688)
Seven years on, very few of those involved in administering elections in the UK would be likely
to quibble if the very same words were used to justify significant change to electoral law in the
rest of the country.
APPENDIX A 67
AppendixA:
The 2005General Election
onMerseyside
The possibility that low turnouts may be, at least in part, the product of low levels of campaign-
ing in ‘safe’ seats is nowhere better illustrated than inMerseyside. In thedrive to introduce region-
al all-postal voting pilots at the 2004 combined local and European elections, the 34 per cent
turnout in Liverpool Riverside at the 2001 General Election attracted frequent comment (see
table A1. Rather less has been made of the fact that Liverpool Riverside, which again recorded
the lowest constituency turnout nationally in 2005 (42per cent), borders four other constituencies
where turnout was under 50 per cent in 2005: Liverpool Walton (45 per cent), Liverpool West
Derby (47 per cent), Bootle (48 per cent) and, just across the Mersey, Birkenhead (49 per cent).
Just as significantly, immediately beyond this tight cluster of parliamentary seatswith low turnout,
levels of electoral participation rise sharply, reaching 68 per cent inWirral South andWirralWest,
and 67 per cent in Crosby. As such, recent general elections across Merseyside’s 16 parliamen-
tary constituencies reveal a growing bifurcation of parliamentary contests broadly typical of
Metropolitan Britain as a whole. In one group, we find safe Labour seats, where overall turnout
is generally low, while a second group of seats are more tightly contested and have significant-
ly higher levels of turnout.
The Merseyside case underlines that these two contrasting types of parliamentary contest are
generally underpinned by a distinct social geography. Low turnouts in safe Labour seats are typ-
ical for constituencies in metropolitan cores with high levels of social deprivation, while higher
turnouts and greater party competition typify elections in the more affluent seats in the metro-
politan periphery (see table A1 for a comparison of Liverpool Riverside and Wirral West).
Sources: Neighbourhood Statistics (2007)
Table A1: A tale of two constituencies: Liverpool Riverside and Wirral West
Liverpool Riverside WirralWest
Adult residents (2001) 73,943 60,132
Distance from central Liverpool (km) 0 12
Residents aged 16–74 without qualifications (%) 32.7 24.3
Residents aged 16–74 economically inactive (%) 51.7 37.1
Registered voters (2005) 74,062 61,086
Turnout (2001) (%) 34 65
Turnout (2005) (%) 42 68
Name and party of MP Louise Ellman, LAB Stephen Hesford, LAB
MP’s majority (%) 32.7 2.7
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Just as significantly, however, theMerseyside case also reveals closely related geographical vari-
ations in campaign spending and in the levels of donations to local parties. The lack of genuine
party competition in safe seats results in low levels of campaign spending among all candidates.
By contrast, where there is greater party competition, there are significantly higher levels of
spending by candidates from all three main parties. Moreover, where seats are genuinely mar-
ginal, candidate spending tends to be highest, while local parties in target seats are also more
likely to be able to attract large donations throughout the parliamentary cycle. This tendency,
which has been discussed in depth in chapter three, is demonstrated clearly in a number of
Merseyside constituencies, including Southport, Crosby, Wallasey and, most evidently, Wirral
West – Wirral West being one of 14 local Conservative parties nationally to receive £40,000 or
more in donations in the run up to the 2005 General Election.
Variations in local party donations and candidate spending cannot be divorced from variations
in turnout – indeed they are likely to be closely related. Figure A1 plots the relationship between
turnout and campaign spending for the 16Merseyside seats in 2005 (campaign spending ismeas-
ured as a percentage of the combined limit spent by candidates from the three main parties).
This graph does not constitute a test of the correlation between turnout and campaign spend-
ing, particularly since other variables, including the socio-economic make-up of the constituen-
cy and themarginality of the seat, would need to be taken into account.However, the graphdoes
suggest a close, basic relationship between the twodatasets, particularly in seatswhere the three
main candidates spend 50 per cent or more of their combined spending limits. Such a conclu-
sion would, moreover, correspond closely with Johnston and Pattie’s (2008) findings that high-
er spending by candidates correspond closely to the additional votes they are able to obtain
(see chapter four).
Figure A1: Relationship between campaign spending and turnout in the
16 Merseyside constituencies, 2005 General Election
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TablesA2 andA3 (seepage 71) present thedata for candidate spending and turnout forMerseyside
16 parliamentary seats inmore detail. In line with the distinction drawn between seats with high
turnout and seats with low turnout, table A2 presents data for central Merseyside’s (‘core’) con-
stituencies, while table A3 does the same for the outerMerseyside (‘peripheral’) constituencies.
As table A2 shows, across the nine parliamentary seats in central Merseyside, all of which have
high levels of socio-economic deprivation, turnout averaged a mere 49 per cent. Across these
seats, all held comfortably by Labour in 2005, levels of campaign spending by Labour incumbents
averaged only 50 per cent of the limit, although this was significantly higher than the average
spending of Conservative and Liberal Democrat candidates (37 per cent and 22 per cent respec-
tively). Table A3, by contrast, paints a quite different picture for the five outer Merseyside con-
stituencies with the lowest level of socio-economic deprivation. In these five seats, turnout
averaged 64 per cent, three percentage points above the national average. Moreover, the rela-
tively close contests in these seats were also reflected in higher spending levels by candidates.
Conservative and Labour candidates typically spent over 80 per cent of the permittedmaximum,
while Liberal Democrat campaigns averaged 52 per cent of the limit. It is notable that in only
one of the nine central Merseyside seats did two of the three candidates from the principal par-
ties spend in excess of 60per cent of the spending limit. By contrast, all fiveof theouterMerseyside
seats exhibited this ‘basic’ level of party competition. Significantly, the six constituencies inwhich
at least two candidates spent at this level were also the six constituencies with the highest level
of turnout across the county.
Previously seen as one of the safest Conservative seats in Northern England,
Wirral West had been one of the more unlikely Labour victories in 1997, when
Stephen Hesford took the seat by a majority of 2,738. Having become the first
ever Labour MP for the area, Hesford successfully defended the seat in 2001,
increasing his majority to 4,035. Significantly, the same pattern was repeated in
three other previously ‘safe’ Merseyside seats lost by the Conservatives in 1997:
Crosby, Wirral South and Southport (where the Liberal Democrats displaced the
Conservatives). As a result, the Conservatives went into the General Election of
2005 without a single seat on Merseyside.
WhileWirralWest rankedas target seatnumber 72 for theConservatives in 2005,
requiringaswingof6percent for it tobewonback fromLabour, it alsoconstituted
the principal Conservative-Labour battleground on Merseyside. It was in this
context that the Conservative Association in Wirral West received just short of
£40,000 in donations between August 2004 and June 2005 from Lord Leonard
Steinberg (the founder of Stanley Leisure Limited, and a Merseyside resident
since 1977). The scale of the investment in the local party in Wirral West and in
the Conservative’s 2005 candidate, Esther McVey, was therefore indicative of
LordSteinberg’s concern to re-secureConservative representationonMerseyside.
During the same period, Lord Steinberg also donated £13,000 to an already well-
resourced Conservative campaign in Southport, to support the campaign to
reclaim that seat from the Liberal Democrats. k
WirralWest
BOX A1
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The scale of Conservative spending in the run-up to the 2005 General Election
prompted sufficient concern to enable the local Labour Party to secure a degree
of financial support via trade unions. However, given Wirral West’s obvious lack
of claim to represent one of Labour’s heartlands, these donations amounted to
a mere £2,350 in the period from July 2004 to June 2005, a small fraction of the
resources assembled by the Conservatives locally. While the candidates of all
three main parties spent a large share of their permitted campaign budget in
2005, the characterof the ‘longcampaign’ prior to the start of theofficial election
period was arguably more significant.
Result 2005General Election
Candidate Party Votes % votes % +/-
S. Hesford Labour 17,543 42.5 -4.7
E. McVey Conservative 16,446 39.9 +2.7
J. Clarke Liberal Democrat 6,652 16.1 +0.5
J. Moore UKIP 429 1.0 +1.0
R. Taylor Alternative Party 163 0.4 +0.4
The focussed targetingof these seatsby theConservativeswasanatural outcome
of the strategy put forward by Michael Ashcroft. In the final event, the strategy
was to prove far less effective on Merseyside, and in the rest of the North West,
than it had in other parts of the country. Hesford retained the seat, albeit with a
significantly reducedmajority, andof the fiveseats inNorthWestEnglandtargeted
by Steinberg for financial support, only one, Lancaster and Wyre, returned a
Conservative MP.
BOX A1 continued
Furthermore, the tendency for political parties to seek to channel resources to potentially
‘winnable’ seats, highlighted in chapter three, has only served to exacerbate the contrasts between
parliamentary contests onMerseyside. A total of £381,290 in registered donations was received
by local units of the threemain parties acrossMerseyside during the period 2001 to 2007.While
local Conservative and Labour parties received broadly similar levels of donations when aggre-
gated across the five constituent local authorities, the targeting of such donations within the
conurbation was highly uneven. Two-thirds of the registered donations were received by local
parties in Sefton and the Wirral, the local authority districts containing the four parliamentary
seats with incumbents on majorities of less than 20 per cent. By contrast, registered donations
to local parties in Liverpool, Knowsley andStHelens,which contain nine of the elevenMerseyside
parliamentary seats with turnouts of 55 per cent and below, accounted for only a third of the
total, with this comprising almost entirely donations to local Labour parties. As such, Labour
donors conformed to type by directing funds towards ‘strongholds’ such as StHelens, whose two
local Labour parties receivedhalf of all registered Labour donations acrossMerseyside as awhole.
Conservative donors also conformed to type by being farmore strategic. The full sumof £168,270
in Conservative donations went to local parties in Sefton and Wirral, of which more than half
went to parties fighting the two Merseyside constituencies targeted by the Conservatives in
2005 (Southport andWirralWest). By contrast, not a single registered donationwas recorded by
local ConservativeAssociations across nine parliamentary constituencies in Liverpool, Knowsley
and St Helens over the same period.
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Table A2: Candidate spending and turnout in core Merseyside constituencies,
2005 General Election, ranked by turnout
Constituency
Candidate Spending as % of limit Turnout
(%) ResultLiberal Democrat Labour Conservative
Liverpool Garston 62 84 21 55 LAB hold
Knowsley North & Sefton East 10 58 19 53 LAB hold
Knowsley South 28 22 52 52 LAB hold
LiverpoolWavertree 56 78 25 51 LAB hold
Birkenhead 8 70 48 49 LAB hold
Bootle 2 54 25 48 LAB hold
LiverpoolWest Derby 5 38 83 47 LAB hold
LiverpoolWalton 13 43 28 45 LAB hold
Liverpool Riverside 12 61 35 42 LAB hold
Average 22 56 37 49 ---
Table A3 Candidate spending and turnout in outer Merseyside constituencies, 2005
General Election, ranked by turnout
Constituency
Candidate Spending as % of limit Turnout
(%) ResultLiberal Democrat Labour Conservative
WirralWest 72 99 93 68 LAB hold
Wirral South 41 91 65 68 LAB hold
Crosby 41 91 91 67 LAB hold
Southport 93 41 87 61 LD hold
Wallasey 12 87 85 58 LAB hold
Average 52 82 84 64 ---
Note: Although part of Merseyside, both St Helens North and St Helens South have not been included in either table.
Both constituencies are geographically part of ‘outer Merseyside’ but are both safe Labour seats which share socio-economic
characteristics associated with the conurbation’s core. Patterns of candidate spending and turnout also correspond more closely
to those in core Merseyside seats.
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Table A4: Sums of registered donations (cash and non-cash) to local political
parties, 2001–2007, by local authority areas in Merseyside
Local
authority
No.
seats
Principal parliamentary
contests
(majority< 20%)
Total
donations:
Con
£
Total
donations:
Lab
£
Total
donations:
Lib Dem
£
Total
donations
£
Knowsley 2 None – 9,750 – 9,750
Liverpool 5 None – 31,474 1,500 32,974
St. Helens 2 None – 75,733 12,012 87,745
Sefton 3 Crosby (Lab-Con)Southport (LD-Con) 57,502 9,294 43,652 110,448
TheWirral 4 WirralWest (Lab-Con)Wirral South (Lab-Con) 110,768 24,499 5,106 140,373
TOTALS 16 168,270 150,750 62,270 381,290
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Appendix B:
Historical evidence of electoral
malpractice in theUK
Statistical data and research evidence relating to electoral malpractice in the UK are extremely
sketchy. To a large degree, the extent of evidence availablemirrors the degree towhich electoral
malpractice was perceived as a problem during different historical periods. The most detailed
evidence available relates to the secondhalf of thenineteenth century,whenelectoralmalpractice
was known to be widespread, and the first quarter of the twentieth century, when it was pro-
gressively eliminated. There is no data at all regarding the extent of electoral malpractice in the
period from 1945–1990, with the absence of data largely reflecting an assumption that electoral
malpractice had been eradicated. In recent years, concerns about the possibility of an increase
in electoral malpractice associated with postal voting have led to limited data sets being com-
piled for the period since the mid-late 1990s. The key trends that may be discerned suggest that
four distinct periodsmaybe identified since 1832,with levels of electoralmalpractice being strong-
ly influenced by legislative change.
1832–1885
Prior to the Corrupt and Illegal Practices Act of 1883 bribery and treating were commonplace in
British parliamentary elections, and elections were routinely subject to legal challenge via elec-
tion petitions. From 1832–1885, a total of 224 election petitions were lodged, representing an
average of 31 election petitions for each of the 13 parliamentary elections during this period
(derived from O’Leary, 1962, appendix 1). According to King (1990, p.246), the most common
allegations contained in petitions submitted from 1832–1885 concerned bribery (the subject of
130 petitions) and treating (89 petitions). The prevalence of such practices is underlined by the
fact that 142 of the 224 petitions (63 per cent) submitted during this period were successful in
relation to the allegationsmade (derived fromO’Leary, 1962, appendix 1). The peak year for elec-
tion petitions was 1865, when a total of 61 petitions were presented (O’Leary, 1962, p.234).
1885–1945
After the 1883 Act, election petitions arising from parliamentary elections were rapidly reduced
and by the early 1900swere typically in single figure.However, there is evidence that bribery and
treating continued, albeit on a reduced scale. Pelling (1967, p.429) suggests that between 1885
and 1910 therewere at least eleven constituencieswhere a proportion of the votes ‘were bought’.
In one such case, the 1905 election in the Borough of Worcester, evidence of treating prompted
the establishment of a Royal Commission of Enquiry. In its report, the Commission identified “a
class of voters, numbering approximately 500, and consisting mainly of the needy and loafing
class, but including a considerable number of workingmen in regular employment, who are pre-
pared to sell their votes for drink ormoney” (Cited in Pelling, 1967, pp.192–3). Despite such cases,
however, there is a general consensus that after themid 1880s “electoral bribery and intimidation
were issues of diminishing significance” (Searle, 1987, p.7). As a result, no parliamentary election
resultwas successfully challengedongroundsof corruptpractices after 1923 (Stewart, 2006, p.657).
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Consequently, election courts becamea rarely used procedure inUKelectoral law, and the report
of the Carn Committee on electoral reform (1948) noted that very few election petitions had
been presented since the 1920s.
1945–1990
While there are no comprehensive records, it appears that very few election petitions were sub-
mitted in the period after 1945. Just four challenges to parliamentary contests heard by election
courts attracted significant press attention at the timeor are referred to in leading law textbooks.
Of these four contests (Mid-Ulster, 1955; North Kensington, 1960; Bristol South-East, 1961;
Winchester, 1997) none concerned corruption or malpractice. The most famous case related to
the overturning of Tony Benn’s election to Bristol South-East on the grounds that hewas amem-
ber of the House of Lords. The remaining three cases all concerned alleged irregularities in elec-
toral administration. While there are no records of allegations of malpractice in local elections,
analysis of media reporting from 1945–1990 suggests that such allegations were exceptionally
rare. During this period the only consistent allegations of electoral malpractice were associated
with elections in Northern Ireland. Such claims principally concerned the practice of ‘gerry-
mandering’ electoral boundaries to the benefit of Unionist parties and the practice of person-
ation alleged to bewidespread in Republican areas. Accusations of personationwere underlined
by the exceptionally high number of tendered ballots submitted in Northern Irish elections dur-
ing this period: 762 tendered ballots were submitted at theNorthern Ireland Assembly elections
of 1982, and 949 at the Westminster elections of 1983 (Mitchell and Gillespie, 1999, p.71).
1990–2007
The limited provision for proxy and postal voting introduced in 1985 and, more significantly, the
introduction of postal voting on demand after 2000, have been associated with a resurgence of
accusations of electoral malpractice in mainland Britain. This sharp increase in accusations of
malpractice ismost clearly reflected in a dramatic rise inmedia reports concernedwith such alle-
gations. However, data relating to prosecutions for electoral fraud and election results contest-
ed via election petitions show that both are typically in single figures annually (see tables B1 and
B2). Prosecutions for electoral fraud and election petitions contesting electoral outcomes have
almost exclusively concerned local elections.However,wheremalpractice has beendemonstrated
it has generally been associatedwith proxy and/or postal ballots, suggesting that it is almost cer-
tain that fraud has increased since remote votingwas first introduced, and subsequently extend-
ed, from themid-1980s onwards. Significantly, strongly convergent trends are evident inNorthern
Ireland, where allegations of electoral malpractice, as well as numbers of tendered ballots, have
declined significantly since the early 1990s.
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Notes: (i) Data are presented on the basis of the principal offence.
(ii) Convictions do not necessarily occur in the same year that proceedings are initiated.
(iii) Offences under RPA include tampering with nomination and ballot papers etc., making false declarations as to
election expenses, bribery, treating, undue influence and personation offences.
(iv) Excludes any cases in Staffordshire
Sources: 1994-2003 – Hansard, 28 Oct 2005 : Column 646W; 2004-2005 – Hansard 5 Mar 2007 :
Column 1738W; 2006 – derived from Electoral Commission analysis of CPS files 2007.
Table B1: Persons proceeded against at magistrates courts and found guilty at all
courts of various fraud related offences under the Representation of the People Act
1983, England and Wales 1994 to 2003 (see notes: i, ii, iii)
Persons proceeded
against
Persons found
Guilty
1994 1 2
1995 12 14
1996 0 0
1997 9 5
1998 7 6
1999 3 5
2000(iv) 2 1
2001 16 10
2002 1 1
2003 0 0
2004 3 3
2005 6 5
2006 2 1
Sources: 1997-2006: Hansard 22 Mar 2007: Column 1105W and 1106W;
2007: John Hemming MP, personal communication.
Table B2: Election petitions submitted, 1997–2007 (England and Wales)
Year Local Parliamentary European Total
1997 1 3 --- 4
1998 0 --- 0 0
1999 8 --- --- 8
2000 4 --- --- 4
2001 2 1 --- 3
2002 5 --- --- 5
2003 8 --- --- 8
2004 4 --- 1 5
2005 1 3 --- 4
2006 9 --- --- 9
2007 8 --- --- 8
TOTALS 50 6 1 57
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Appendix C:
Convictions for electoral offences and
electoralmisconduct, 2000–2007
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AppendixD:
Summary reviewof the Electoral
Commission’s analysis of theCPS files
relating to allegations of electoral
malpractice, 2000–2006
During witness sessions for the Committee on Standards in Public Life’s (2006) inquiry into the
work of the Electoral Commission reference was made to the Crown Prosecution holding files
relating to over three hundred possible cases of electoral fraud since 2000. Subsequently, the
Crown Prosecution Service provided the Electoral Commission with access to 390 files believed
to contain information on allegations of electoral offences in England and Wales made during
2000-2006. These allegations relate to specific provisions in electoral law, principally the
Representation of the People Act, 1983.
Source: Derived from Electoral Commission, 2007a, pp. 6–8.
Table D1: Allegations of electoral malpractice reported to the
Crown Prosecution Service, 2000–2006
Year
Electoral
administration
& registration
Election
campaigning
Voting (e.g.
personation,
treating)
All allegations
2000 4 37 7 50
2001 2 56 10 66
2002 2 46 11 59
2003 4 70 16 90
2004 2 39 17 59
2005 4 32 24 59
2006 2 11 6 19
TOTALS 20 291 91 402
The Electoral Commission’s analysis of theCPS files has beenpublished in twobrief reports, pub-
lished in March 2007 and November 2007 respectively. In its initial analysis, which excluded
files relating cases still under consideration in early 2007, the Electoral Commission estimated
there to have been 402 allegations of electoral offences from 2000-2006 (see table D1). The
Electoral Commission found that the vast majority of these allegations (72 per cent) were con-
cernedwith aspects of electoral campaigning, relating principally to electoral expenses and elec-
tion materials. By contrast, only 23 per cent of allegations were found to concern offences such
as personation, treating and undue influence, and just 5 per cent with aspects of electoral reg-
istration or electoral administration.
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The Commission’s subsequent analysis specified that 23 files could been excluded on grounds of
being ‘open’, identified that eight files had been destroyed, five files were duplicates and 42 files
related to offences not covered under the Representation of the People Acts. At the same time,
it was established that whilemany files related to individuals, several files contained allegations
againstmultiple persons. As a result, theCommission’s database used as a basis formore detailed
analysis comprises 383 separate entries.
From these 383 entries, 80 per cent concern local elections (including town and parish councils),
15 per cent concern parliamentary elections, with the remaining five per cent relating to elec-
tions to the European Parliament, the Welsh Assembly, and the Greater London Authority. In
total, the 383 entries arise from in excess of 25,134 separate elections held in the UK from 2000-
2006. The analysis also found that every police force in England and Wales, with the exception
of the City of London police, had submitted evidence relating to allegations of electoral fraud to
CPS during 2000-06. While the larger police forces serving the major metropolitan areas have
submitted a disproportionate number of cases to CPS, the Electoral Commission suggests that
there is no clear geographical pattern to accusations of electoral fraud. Furthermore, the
Commission’s analysis suggests that the incidence of cases is lowacross all police authority areas,
once population variation is taken into account (see tableD2). Thus, although61 of the 383 entries
(16 per cent) relate to cases investigatedby theMetropolitanPolice, this comprises just 0.8 entries
permillion inhabitants across Greater London. Adjusted for population in this way, the case files
amount to between 0.1 and 2 cases per million of population in each police authority area.
Source: Electoral Commission, 2007b, p.7
Table D2: Number of entries in the Electoral Commission database of allegations
of electoral malpractice by Police Authority area, 2000–2006,
ranked by entries per million of population (top 12 only)
Rank Police Authority area Number ofentries
Population per
police authority
Entries per million
of population
served
1 Bedfordshire 12 576,218 2.1
2 Dorset 12 700,419 1.7
3 Merseyside 23 1,365,832 1.7
4 Essex 26 1,635,605 1.6
5 Lancashire 21 1,434,871 1.5
6 Leicestershire 11 945,480 1.2
7 Northumbria 16 1,396,374 1.1
8 West Midlands 25 2,579,153 1.0
9 Greater Manchester 22 2,539,043 0.9
10 Staffordshire 9 1,050,609 0.9
11 Thames Valley 18 2,120,859 0.8
12 Metropolitan 61 7,420,617 0.8
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There can be little doubt that cases recorded on the CPS files suggest a relatively low incidence
of fraud. However, it is less clear that the data derived from the CPS files suggest that there is
no clear geographical pattern associated with accusations of fraud. It is certainly true that the
geographical spread of electoral fraud cases investigated by the police in England and Wales is
remarkable. Moreover, it is accurate to say that “no geographic area or type of area has a
monopoly on allegations of electoral malpractice” (Electoral Commission, 2007a, p.2). At the
same time, however, it is possible to identify from the Electoral Commission’s spreadsheet, four
police authority areas –Greater London, Lancashire, theWestMidlands andGreaterManchester
– which account for a disproportionate number of the cases contained on the CPS files. As table
D3 shows, these four police forces serve approximately 27 per cent of the population of England
and Wales, but account for 34 per cent of the entries on the CPS files and a full 60 per cent of
the subsequent convictions. Indeed, closer analysis suggests an evenmore localised concentra-
tion, particular if convictions are considered. Within these four Police Authority areas, there are
–making up 2.7 per cent of the population of England andWales, which account for ten per cent
of the entries on the CPS files and 50 per cent of the convictions listed.
Source: Derived from the Electoral Commission, 2007b.
Table D3: Geographical areas associated with highest levels of electoral fraud
allegations and high proportions of convictions for electoral offences
Area Combinedpopulation
% of population
of England and
Wales
% of entries on
CPS files
% of
prosecutions on
CPS files
Greater London, Lancashire,
West Midlands, and Greater
Manchester
14 million 26.9 34 60
Oldham, Birmingham, Burnley
and Blackburn with Darwen 1.4 million 2.7 10 50
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Appendix E:
Analysis of donations tomarginal seats at
the 2005General Election
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Appendix F:
List of interviewees
• June Butler, Assistant Chief Electoral Officer, The Electoral Office for Northern Ireland;
• Peter Facey, Chief Executive, Unlock Democracy;
• Jason Kitcat, Open Rights Group;
• David Monks, Chief Executive, Huntingdon Borough Council and Society of Local Authority
Chief Executives (SOLACE) – lead on electoral matters;
• Ken Ritchie, Chief Executive, Electoral Reform Society;
• Andrew Scallan, Director of Electoral Administration, Electoral Commission;
• David Shaw, Assistant Chief Constable, West Midlands Police and Association of Chief
Police Officers (ACPO) – lead on electoral fraud;
• Kate Sullivan, Head of Electoral Administration, Electoral Commission;
• John Turner, Chief Executive, Association of Electoral Administrators.
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“…and by all lawful means to promote or endeavour to secure purity of election
for Parliament, and for all municipal and other public bodies in the United
Kingdom, and by all lawful means to influence public opinion in favour of all
such legislative or social reforms as shall to the Company appear desirable.”
This was one of the objectives Joseph Rowntree set for himself, his fellow
directors and successors in the founding document of the Joseph Rowntree
Reform Trust Ltd in 1904. In this report Stuart Wilks-Heeg has demonstrated
there are a number of reasons to call into question ‘the purity of elections’ in
the UK today.
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